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A  Q U A D RA N T O F V IEW S 
by
S id n e y  C. S u f r i n ( * )
Abstract
The rules of micro and macro analysis are different just as the subject 
matters of each are different. The assumptions of each, however, are, 
by the nature of the discipline of economics, not necessarily useful models 
of any reality which is being considered. The contingent or accidental 
characteristics of any situation may require a special even unique analysis. 
This contingency nature of the real situation distinguishes social analysis 
from physical analysis. Economics and social science generally has tended 
to neglect the significance of the particular setting.
DI I
I
In general large areas of behavior, such as business, which are to be 
investigated are divided into subareas which, on the surface at least, or 
by their presumed nature, have significant common elements. This pro­
cedure is the beginning of the analytic process. The assumption of significant 
common elements, and the presumption of the nature of the phenomenon, 
of course, require testing to justify the initial divisions. Our point is that 
we get to known about phenomena by analytic insights. Only then can 
synthesis lead to a holistic appreciation. To grasp the unity, the gestalt 
at once is rare in social science research and understanding. The pheno­
menon in question is divided into parts, the relations among the parts
(*) University of Massachusetts at Amherst. School of Business Administration, 
Amherst, Mass.
The author wishes to thank his colleague Joseph Finnerty for his comments and insights.
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hypothesized and then tested in a series of « go rounds ». Only then is the 
bigger unity adduced. In short, analysis requires an elaborate hunch- 
inductive-deductive method. The purpose of this paper is to suggest the 
theoretical support for a synthetic planning discipline.
In investigating business, our present concern, a firm or market 
is often chosen as the subject of the inquiry. But business, in general, and 
markets in general, too, may be the subjects of inquiry. Especially since 
the General Theory of Keynes, the division of the world to be analyzed 
as « micro » and « macro » has been a common division. This is because 
the order, rules, and reactions (if they are, in fact, subject to useful and 
meaningful generalization) of micro units and macro systems are signi­
ficantly different. Indeed one might argue that the two aspects of (1) 
business in general, comprehending total market behavior, and (2) business 
in particular i.e. a firm or even an industry are quite different. That 
industries might have peculiarities or even uniqueness when compared to 
other industries, or firms when compared to other firms, or even macro 
systems when compared with other macro systems e.g. European markets 
compared with American, or underdeveloped countries when compared to 
developed countries, gives rise to investigations which fall outside the 
traditional and formal micro and macro undertakings, although related to 
them in content and technique.
The analyses of phenomena which are not comprehended by the more 
traditional micro and macro analyses often incorporate in the study insti­
tutional or other factual data peculiarly related to what is being considered. 
For example issues in, and facts of, land ownership, banking functions and 
religious matters may and do find their way into so called « country 
studies» of less developed countries. Such considerations, as peculiar in­
clusions, are not required of traditional analyses of developed countries 
because they are well known to analyst and reader, or they are irrelevant. 
For example religious or political considerations are usually of small im­
portance in analyzing capital markets or the production policy of a firm in 
the European or American contexts, but may be of importance in analyzing 
similar phenomena in Chad, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia or Poland. Such nor­
mally extraneous considerations may become significant in analyzing a 
western economy if, for example, there is a significant political change 
in being or in the offing as in France before and after President Mitterand 
or the U.S. before and after Mr. Reagan’s term of office.
Our major point is that phenomena to be studied are broken into 
parts somehow believed to be relevant; and the parts are investigated as 
having a bearing on, and connections with, each other. Insight, an important
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device, is largely grasping persuasively significant relations among parts, 
relationships hitherto neglected or overlooked. Analysis is systematic and 
assumes an ordered system. The system is not necessarily holistic, by 
which we mean the system or synthesis of parts does not necessarily 
make up the system or synthesis of the great whole. To know how 
apples grow and apple trees prosper does not give much insight into 
how an apple orchard is maintained and successfully operated. A fine 
arborist may not know much about running a tree farm.
As an aside we may remark that the goals of the firm — profitability, 
perpetuity, saleability, and acceptability are not the goals of the economy — 
to wit general income, general employment, general stability, and general 
growth. It is not that micro unit analysis conflicts with macro analysis; 
it is that they are different phenomena, with differing assumptions and 
analytic techniques.
Analysis, it seems to us, for large or small units, is most effective 
when applied to historical, which are often statistical, data. History is not 
always well known. Knowledge about history depends often on analysis 
which to be effective would have had to know all about what is being 
examined. But then the analysis would have been unnecessary. Because 
analysis provides interfact relations (relying on hunch, deductive and induc­
tive methods), one can never be certain that all the relevant relations have 
been explored, or all relevent facts adduced and insights exhausted. The 
rich often conflicting discussions of religion and capitalism have not 
resulted in conclusions which persuade everyone. In business and economics, 
analysis is so often statistical and there is a feeling, often unjustified, that 
the data are accurate enough and the technical analyses effective enough 
to provide knowledge which is sufficiently certain to provide in turn 
reasonably valid conclusions about such diverse matters as future behavior, 
market structure or effective managerial organization. Obviously micro 
conclusions are not likely to be so generally significant as macro con­
clusions and decisions. A wrong macro decision, if acted on might be 
disastrous, but fortunately the opportunities for macro controls in our 
society are much more rare than for micro decisions. Macro and micro 
systems ideally are of time 1, time 2, and so on, with t \ , h . . . t n being 
successive or close to each other in calendar time and after abstracting from 
regular that is seasonal, cyclical or secular changes. The analysis is periodic.
Herein lies the rub, a rub which applies both to macro and micro 
analyses: the time of the application of the conclusion, the decision based 
on the analyses, may not at all be homogeneous with the time environment
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of the analysis. Granting we have abstracted from regular changes, but 
should we not be concerned with the very nature of the setting in which 
a micro or macro decision will be placed. Some very short period expec­
tations e.g. day to day change in the stock market are probably less stable 
than the intermediate e.g. annual sales expectations for many business. 
But the setting for longer range expectations may vary widely from the 
realities of the past.
There is an agreement that if h and h or t„ are sufficiently widely 
spaced, the findings of ti, by findings we mean relationships between parts 
of a system, will not often be valid in h . Changing technology is considered 
by some analysts to invalidate analyses which assume the continued use of 
technologies already in place. Other analysts assume ideology and changes 
therein make an analysis based on data of the past suspect or invalid 
when applied to the future. We feel both points of view are justified by 
experience. In the brief space of a decade, for example, the employment 
pattern of American industry changed because of legal and ideological 
changes relating to the employment of women and other groups defined 
by race or degree of physical handicap. Similarly the development of the 
micro chip, and user and industrially friendly computer devices, have 
changed the relative prices and production fashions of such varied efforts 
as the manufacture of calculators, timepieces, the banking and securities 
business and the teaching profession. Similarly medicine and health services 
have been changed by new technologies in a decade or less.
What we are suggesting is that (economic) relations may undergo 
organic change of serious significance in short periods of a decade or less. 
The environment of exchanges, of course, may change hour to hour or 
day to day but nevertheless with trends lasting 5 months to several years. 
In this circumstance what was true at h may have no or little relevance 
to h . But we are suggesting more than such changes.
At ti, let us assume, there is a certain set of relations among variables. 
On the macro level of analysis, a large public deficit may occur along with 
higher than normal interest rates, a large public budget, low savings 
and investment, etc. The relationships are many and provocative because 
alternative possible causes and effects are suggested, and alternative causes 
and effects seem to explain the course of current events. There is the 
the extension of the current course of events to the future. The shape 
of the future in turn is deduced from the observed or expected new or 
old sets of relationships. During 1980-81-82-83 nearly all concerned people 
guessed how the public deficit would affect interest rates, how tax policy 
might affect the price and production levels, and so on. All could not be
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right at the same time because the analyses and projected conclusions 
varied widely on such matters as price level, investment, employment, and 
government revenues. Yet each might have been correct given some special 
set of relations, based on ideology, technology or simply new relations 
among old variables. For example if, for one reason or another, builders 
expected a boom in building and acted on their expectations, mortgage 
rates might have risen or not, depending on how mortgage lenders, banks 
and mortgage companies sized up the future. If these lenders thought 
the future to be bright because of the enthusiasm of borrowers, the risk 
premium on loans might have fallen, and in the face of an increase in 
demand, prices might have not risen. To the degree that lenders to 
lending companies shared the euphoria, the supply of savings might 
have increased.
On the other hand if bankers and mortgage companies did not share the 
euphoria or at least feeling of prosperity being around the corner of the 
building industry, a building boom would not have evinced itself. (Herein is 
contained Keynes’ «animal spirits», which we slightly dignify as ideology).
Another hypothetical example would be that bankers have sufficient 
reserves to increase their lending. Borrowers, however, are unwilling to 
borrow in great quantities because they believe that future will be gloomy. 
The threat of cost inflation, the general lack of lively animal spirits, or 
what not, are depressants. The public budget deficit was probably such a 
deflator of animal spirits, more as a matter of ideology rather than technical 
perception. Risk then permeates the business community. The result 
is the bankers are affected by the fear and raise their offering price for funds.
Why, one might ask, were not the bankers equally affected by the fear 
of stagflation as were the borrowers? To an extent, no doubt they were, 
or would be in our hypothetical example. But, generally speaking, banks 
seem to be willing to lend without the same strength of inhibition which 
business borrowers exhibit in borrowing. The loans to Third World and 
Soviet Bloc nations are a case in point. One did not have to have the 
learning and insight of a David Ricardo to set that such loans in the 
’60s and 7 0 s  were not likely to be easily serviced and repaid. On the 
domestic scene the loans made to, and rates charged for, home mortgages, 
farm equipment, and other undertakings in the 70 s made sense only 
if inflation became a way of American life. The borrowers who paid the 
high rates to banks were at the effective margin and probably not the 
traditional business borrowers. The proof, one supposes, is in the over 
10% unemployment and declining real industrial output of the late 70s 
and early 80s.
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On the other hand, if banks, for one reason or another reduced lending 
costs, the reaction would be especially great in such generally small endeavors 
as home building and buying and other speculatively oriented activities. 
Our guess is traditional business borrowing would increase, but more 
slowly and hesitantly than the two areas, we suggest.
What we are saying is that various perceptions of the significance 
of economic and business realities may have varying kinds and degrees 
of importance for various actors at several time settings. A large public 
deficit looks different in its size and potential effects if industry is working 
at 40% -60%  or 80%  of capacity. A wage « giveback» i.e. voluntary 
reduction in wages, has quite a different effect and cause, if a firm is on 
the verge of bankruptcy (Chrysler in 1978-9) or if industry generally is 
in a slump. The perceived setting of the firm and the economy justify or 
even require cause and effect relationships which could not be justified 
nor required under other circumstances.
It then follows that what was found to be a reasonable, persuasive 
analysis of h, might be neither reasonable nor persuasive at h. Now if 
t\ and h are close, say, for most ordinary business situations a month or 
two apart, and seasonality and cyclical changes are abstracted, t\ and h may 
be considered as psychologically, ideologically and in general, homogeneous. 
But the homogeneity cannot always be assumed because exogenous variables 
can play hob with expectations even in the short run. The Reagan 1984-5 
military budget, a big element in the expected deficit, became much more 
acceptable after KAL007 was shot down than before.
II
Now we may turn our attention to ideology as an index of expectation.
People are motivated to act by their passions and by their interests f1). 
Passions are not rationally based, although the means to achieve them may 
be rational. The belief in a particular theology, kind of government, or 
love of a particular society, class or state is not always, or perhaps ever, 
legitimated as enriching or assuring power to a person. Yet the passion 
may be adhered to at great personal cost. Interests are more specifically 
defined in the light of services and goods, of wealth and power. People 
strive by rational, as well as nonrational means to achieve the goals of 
their interests. *
(J) Albert O. H irschman, The Passions and the Interests, Princeton, 1971.
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Together the interests and the passions as goals and their attendant 
means constitute, in our language, the ideologies of individuals or of 
society. Ideologies are values in action. We stress action, for a belief about 
which nothing is done by the individual or the society and its segments 
are but beliefs, inert, inactive, and mildly flavor the legitimation process 
which individuals and societies use to justify behavior or its lack. But 
ideology is active. It legitimates and motivates action outside the ordinary, 
thus giving social and private behavior their flavors.
Passions and interests, which is to say ideology, are bonds connecting 
the past and the future. But because they are connective social tissues does 
not assure or even suggest that the past is connected to similarly effective 
social organs of the future.
I l l
Some periods of history are less given to changing internal relations 
and changing values than others. Societies do have internal dynamics, and 
do respond to exogenous forces. The dynamics of change and the exogenous 
forces are felt by and, from the social point of view, through people and 
their ideological reactions.
In brief we are suggesting that the immediate causative force in social 
life is the minds of individuals. We realize that this is a point of view 
perhaps more agreeable to the nineteenth century than to the late 
twentieth. John Stuart Mill, his father, and the intelligencia of the period 
could more easily accept the role of social thinkers as defining the 
parameters of morality and politics than social thinkers 50 or 100 years 
later when legitimation tended to be «scientific».
After Darwin and after the enormous success of physical science in 
explaining how the world really works, the role of the middle or upper 
class intellectuals as legitimating social behavior declined, in fact as well 
as in the minds of such leadership. Forces, social or physical, tendencies 
arising from the confluence of physical or observable events, statistical 
probability become powerful legitimations of social behavior. Not that 
social forces were shown to be divorced from the passions and the interests. 
On the contrary. Technology as a great power was and still is stressed by 
many thinkers, other than Marxian. Interest however has shifted from 
self interest to class interest to become a social force, and legitimation by 
democratic forms became itself a passion rather than a logical interest!2).
(2) C. West Churchman, Challenge to Reason, McGraw Hill, 1968.
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This reliance on form rather than substance or motive is seen constantly 
in the political sphere. Autocratic and totalitarian regimes claim to be 
« Peoples’ Republics », a democratic legitimation, or to prove legitimacy 
by showing the government was elected, regardless of how rigged the 
election was or if the programs and policies on which a regime was 
elected are programs and policies of repression and violence against many 
people. The current distinction between autocratic and totalitarian states, 
as the former being tolerable and the latter bad, is a strange distinction 
for politically sensitive people and administrations to make at the end of 
the twentieth century. The promulgators of such a view must have scant 
respect for or concern with people as individuals. To consider foreign 
or public policy of the U.S. as independent of people — foreign or American, 
is to treat policy as a « force » having a significance over and above its 
effect on people. It is, one might say, a twentieth century fallacy. The 
U.S. Marine officer who destroyed a Vietnamese village in «order to 
save i t » was a child of his time.
Events only have meaning as they affect people or, as an older philo­
sophical view would have it, affect the sensory apparatus and thus mind 
of a person, God being the ultimate recorder of trees which fall in the 
forest when no human is around to hear or see them fall. But in a more 
matter of fact setting, if something occurs either in the course of a usual 
sequence of events or as a novel event, unless it has sensory or intellectual 
meaning for someone, preferably more than merely one, it is a non- 
event. When noxious chemicals were placed in the unused ditch which once 
was the Love Canal, it was a usual disposal effort, soon to be a non event. 
However when the disposal, years later, was related to effects on people, 
the whole analysis and significance changed. The non event became an 
event of momentous significance not only to those immediately involved, 
but to the whole nation, affecting national policy, which is to say awareness 
of many people, including those in high places. The reality, slow to be 
realized, it took almost a decade, was not a reality because of the political 
party in power, or because the regime was totalitarian or what not. The 
relevance of the reality was its effect on people and on their thinking 
and perceptions. IV
IV
What we are suggesting in this discussion is that the long run and 
the short run, for more useful general social analysis, be divided into the 
past and the future, with the present, as an ever advancing historical edge.
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One result of such a time division would be to direct attention to 
questions of deviations (in calendar time) of phenomena, and of the time 
duration and time elapses in the various past events becoming effective 
after some causative changes were introduced. Once time becomes an 
explicit variable, the process of change and realization become more 
obvious or at least more likely to be noticed. Frustrations between cause 
and result would also probably be more exposed. If, for an example, a firm 
offers an article for sale at $X, and while the product is being produced, 
stocked and delivered a competitor offers a substitute at $1/2  X, the original 
price plan is likely to be frustrated and the offer price changed. This 
surely happened when a computer company offered a small computer at a 
price only to have a large company, untruthfully it later turned out, 
declare it too, had a small computer in the works, and it would be sold at 
a lower price than the real, live computer was offered for. Analytically the 
traditional long run-short run breakdown, we feel, while statically useful, 
may lead to confusion in the day to day, week to week analysis of events 
in the market, factory and laboratory. The specific real event is never exactly 
like the theoretical one. To rely entirely on theoretical abstraction to 
gauge the future is, in our opinion, folly.
Statistical analysis, in its various aspects, usually permits of a more 
pointed analysis than general micro or macro abstractions. Statistics deals, 
among other things, with measures of central tendency. Heights, weights, 
business activity, prices are expressed as average or tendencies over time 
with probability wrappings. An increase of G.N.P. by a given percent will 
probably affect the tax take of the federal tax system, say, by one and half 
a percentage points greater than the GNP increase, and state revenues by 
one percentage point, and local revenues by a smaller relative increase. 
No one expects the realized numbers to exactly equal the estimated amounts. 
There is a probability wrapping.
We suggest that for many purposes this approach is proper. We 
also would make two additional suggestions.
(1) The errors about the estimated values may or may not be random 
at different times. That is to say at h the assumed model may be appropriate 
(properly specified) so that the distribution of the errors about the 
estimated value or values are randomly distributed. But at h the errors 
about estimated values may not be random, indicating that relevant rela­
tionships are not fully contemplated by the model. This is of great 
importance, we hold, because in a complex, dynamic world the role, 
causative or otherwise, of a variable may change. For example, as we 
pointed out earlier, the deficit of the public budget and interest rates, has
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diverse effects depending on expectations, state of the economy, and 
other factors.
The second suggestive observation we would make is more basic. 
In our thinking we distinguish between disciplines which are concerned 
with invariant, or largely invariant relations as physics and chemistry, and 
disciplines concerned with organic life e.g. botany, medicine and zoology. 
These latter disciplines merge into the social disciplines such as economics, 
politics, anthropology and psychology. The lines are not sharply drawn 
for those who work at the margins of the first two, and at the margins of 
the third and second. We are not suggesting a Comtean hierarchy, but only 
that the fields of study are divisible like Gaul into 3 parts, or like the 
U.S. into 50.
Our point is that in what we generally consider the social disciplines, 
great care be exercised in making generalizations which purport to be 
valid over time. And further that we suggest that the resort to the idea of 
force be limited to a metaphorical use. All experience keeps telling us that 
the regular and limited behavior of the physical and organic side of the 
experiential spectrum is not matched by similar regularity and limitation 
on the social side. V
V
This is not to say that the social experience is not ordered. Indeed 
the mind imposes an order which we posit as real and, so far as we can 
determine, there are (alternative) orders of behavior on the social scene 
legitimated largely by their persuasiveness. We say « orders of behavior » 
because we believe that cause and effect always operate, but in different 
settings, either ideological or real and experimental. A cause in one setting 
may produce different effects than in other settings. The perception of 
the setting, its evaluation as well as its reality, are of greater significance, 
in our opinion, in social analysis than in physical, while in organic matters 
generally, the role of the setting is more important than in physical matters 
and dynamics. Gravity operates regardless of whether the observer is post 
or pre Newton. But the way a price system works differs in societies with 
different ideologies.
Perception, in social matters, is a powerful factor in determining 
behavior, ultimately personal behavior. Actions, decisions, gains and losses, 
in general, are ultimately personal. Group action occurs when, for one set 
of reasons or another, many or some people act in concert. Such actions
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may spring from the reactions of individuals or be imposed; but imposition 
is also a measure of individual behavior. Individuals do deny the causative 
nature of imposition in some circumstances. In a dramatic sense Bonhoffer 
gave his life rather than conform to Nazi pressure. In a less dramatic sense 
a big fraction of voters, even in a fairly lopsided election, usually vote for 
the losing candidate.
The law or rule in social analysis is rarely more than a statement of a 
tendency of behavior. People, in a decision making mode, rarely all or even 
in overwhelming proportions make identical decisions. In the stock market, 
quantities bought and sold are necessarily equal, and usually a small change 
in price will call forth additional offers of purchase and sale. The numbers 
of traders on each side of the trades, in this case is not important, their 
control over numbers of shares is. The decision to buy or sell is in this 
case made, generally speaking, in terms of price. A buyer at instant one may 
become a seller at instant two. When a number of buyers or sellers who 
are willing and able to marshall large sums of money decide to buy or sell, 
the concerted action seems like a mechanical law. From our viewpoint it 
is more correct to see the phenomenon as a psychological action of a number 
of individuals who are able to buy and/or sell large quantities of a security. 
The buying or selling are based on decisions which in turn are based on 
current perceptions about the future. Theory, gossip and reliance on 
leadership play roles in making people think and act similarly.
VI
This general approach to social phenomena tends to make perception, 
a psychological process, and decision making, again a psychological pheno­
menon, central. Leadership and followership, as social phenomena, are 
then easily adduced as additional psychological phenomena in the decision 
making process, which operates, although with different inputs and outputs 
at the micro and macro levels.
Control over the real and psychological environment, power in the 
usual sense of that word, then becomes a central idea of social activity, 
whether personal (micro) or more general (macro) (3). Leadership, the
(3) Cf. William J am es, «T he Will to Behave», in Ten Great Works of Philosophy, 
R. P. Wolff ed„ Mentor, 1969.
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ability or power to secure conformance, legally constituted or otherwise 
constituted (e.g. illegally as by threat and coercion, or by status and class, 
or by education, training and title) is the recognition of control by those 
controlled. Followership is the social habit of conforming behavior to the 
signals of leadership. A discipline of the sociology of management or 
business, and a discipline of the sociology of economics or markets, pre­
sumably would analyze these phenomena in the light of leadership and 
followership, power and control. Such disciplinary efforts are in short 
supply.
One should not expect regularities of group and personal behavior 
taking place if the setting is altered by changes in the power system. 
Individual action is not immune from control and power systems which are 
the settings of behavior. Judgement is an integral part of the setting. The 
control over a soldier in barrack life is different from the control over 
the same man on a bathing beach with his friends. The former is more 
rigid and demanding than the latter. The decisions made on the stock 
exchange are not necessarily affected by the same psychological forces as 
decisions made by the same person in considering the financial and 
educational setting of a son or daughter. Yet the sum and interactions of 
personal decisions similar to those affecting sons and daughters may be 
ultimately exercised in the stock market. The consideration is that a child’s 
education which includes costs and personal consideration is simply 
different from the rules of investment although the two are related in 
goal. Control, as judgement, is at work in these cases. The capacity by 
an outside force to induce a given behavior is power. The army, 
conventional rules, the police, ethical values, these are power mani­
festations. The role of personal judgement in the action is not always 
of obvious significance.
If the setting of a decision and the depths of the setting in psychological 
needs, wants, goals and legitimations, both personal and social, are very 
powerful, it would seem to follow that any idea of rational expectations is 
an empty phrase if the rationality, power and skill components cannot 
overcome the setting. Knowledge, motive and goal, in our conception, adjust 
fairly quickly if not necessarily minute to minute or day to day. But 
market power relations, in short, the settings of behavior over time, are not 
constant like the speed of light or Keppler’s Laws. One of the great 
tasks of economics and political science is or should be to define and explain 
the settings hypothesized by each discipline, and the dynamics of such 
settings.
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VII
To this end we suggest the development of an additional social 
discipline, Synthetic Planning. We use the word Synthetic rather than 
Strategic because we are stressing the synthesis of analysis rather than the 
devising of a master plan. Strategy and tactics derive from synthesis and 
analysis. Synthetic Planning (S. P.) like decision under uncertainty theory 
(a fairly micro discipline) is based on the assumption that the future will 
not be like the past. However, the future, specifically the future relevant 
for the purposes at hand, may be at least vaguely defined in a better way 
than by mere guess, hunch, or what is worse, by assuming the future will 
be a replication or almost a replication of the immediate past.
Let us assume a firm desires to make forward investments, over the 
next 5 years, to last at least 20 years. The inventory of investments in 
place, of currently available skills, etc. are known. The present state of 
markets is known. What are not known are (1) the market setting or 
better probable alternative settings of the future and (2) the likely desires 
of owners and managers of the firm in the future. To some extent (2) is 
controllable. The organization, its ideology and structure are in part, pos­
sibly large part, within the power potential of managers. After all 20 years 
is not an infinity, it is less than a generation, and the choosing of managerial 
personnel and its training are within the control, at least presumed control, 
of present management.
It is the market, the outside, which acts as if it were independent. 
Some control, however, is possible via advertising, lobbying and research 
and development. Matters of demography can be analyzed and extrapolated. 
Political, social and fashion tendencies can be analyzed and extrapolated, 
and alternatives hypothesized. Extrapolated is the hard word, for extrapo­
lation cannot mean mere extention of the past to the future. In short S .P . 
is or will be the act of estimating what the relevant future might be like 
insofar as a particular activity is concerned. A firm might decide to expand, 
change its nature, do nothing, go out of business, etc. A government would 
have a basis for expectations with respect to taxes, expenditures, war, 
peace, development, and so on.
In short S .P . would convert analysis, mainly an historical tool for 
exposing a relevant sector of the world to synthesis, a future conception, or 
state of conceptions of the relevant world. Control of the future is not, or in 
our opinion at least should not be considered as a major purpose of S. P.
The future has a will of its own which cannot easily be subdued, nor 
should it be subdued for the benefit of a firm. The ideal is to suggest a few
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alternative settings which have some probability of occurring, in some 
general and rough fashion, so that an institution moves into the future with 
some guidance. To some degree S. P. may suggest control and power but 
the very size of the world, its complexity and above all its capacity to 
change dynamically, discontinuously, and by addition and deletion, make 
any widespread attempts at controlling the future by conscious planning 
likely to fail. This is especially true if the attempts are directed toward 
controlling and redirecting social values and undertakings normally legiti­
mated by the society and its parts by formal democratic means and 
informally by discussion and debate. Such attempts, in important matters 
would be a monstrous social wickedness, an enormity against decency.
As in all decision making, analysis, and synthesis, S .P . must be tested 
and amended by judgement. Judgement in this sense is testing and legi­
timating conclusions and reasoning by the legitimation of experience, 
wisdom and ideological values which, in each case, are not themselves 
analysed. The judgment process is in this context the final approval, 
disapproval, emandation or substitution by leadership, and the acceptance 
by followership. There is no substitute for judgment as legitimating analysis 
and synthesis (4).
Conclusion





do not provide a realistic dynamic of changes taking place in time, that 
different events and connections require different calendar periods of 
elapsed time, that exogenous variables are almost always active, that the 
ideology and changed structure affects the perceptions of the actors. A 
model or system based on the four divisions suggested above is not 
satisfactory as a guide for the future. The four divisions above are essentially 
static.
(4) Kenneth Boulding, « The Verifiability of Economic Images », in S. R. K rupp, 
The Structure of Economic Science, Prentice Hall, 1966.
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A Synthetic Planning framework probably would 1) exclude what seems 
to be irrelevant micro and macro likely developments and 2) attempt to 
examine and « think about» the interaction of activities of the separate 
disciplines of the past. This would lead to trying to imagine their interactive 
persistence in the future. For example how did record keeping and inventory 
control, via the computer, affect production planning, and how did 
computer regulated production affect sales and inventory practices? This 
and similar interactions have been major interdisciplinary transfers which 
have not been well integrated into the business disciplines. How such 
possible and probable interactions might occur in the future, given possible 
changes in technology and ideology are suggestive for Synthetic Planning.
The idea of interaction thus would be expanded from experience 
within one of several firms to interindustry and inter institutional possible 
experiences. For example health care techniques not only induced reorga­
nizations of medical facilities but also generated ideological and legislative 
changes e.g. abortion, organ transplants, and kidney dialysis. How sug­
gestive are such developments?
The interactive idea, we suggest, is at the heart of Synthesis, as are 
technology and ideology.
Useful advice and guidance are essentially pragmatic, in the light of 
probabilistic settings. To secure such probabilistic settings we suggest 
that Synthetic Planning be used. It is the least bad of the alternatives, 
for time, as event, is made to cut across the static-dynamic universe, and 
the future is partially, if awkwardly, converted into history.
UN QUADRANTE DI MODI D I VEDERE
La microeconomia e la macroeconomia differiscono quanto a contenuti e 
a tecniche analitiche impiegate. Nelle situazioni reali, com’è ben noto, l’insieme 
di assunti su cui si fonda l’analisi è più limitata rispetto ai fatti della realtà. 
Questo è necessario se l’analisi (o la teoria) deve essere generalizzabile e attenta 
esclusivamente all’essenza o alla natura del fenomeno. Tuttavia, restringendo 
l’insieme degli assunti, condizioni significative, fatti e relazioni importanti 
vengono spesso trascurati, sicché l’analisi è logicamente ineccepibile ma non 
ha validità né utilità. Ciascuna situazione ha le proprie peculiarità e aspetti 
unici e non è possibile escludere, in forza delle ipotesi adottate, che tali peculiarità 
e unicità possano essere vitali o quanto meno significative nel modo in cui 
una determinata situazione si svolge. Un determinato fattore, per esempio un 
deficit pubblico, può avere un ruolo assai diverso in una situazione di elevata 
disoccupazione anziché in caso di inflazione o in una condizione di stagflazione.
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I giudizi sintetici ricavabili sulla base delle procedure analitiche consuete possono 
dunque rivelarsi poco attendibili a causa di significative intromissioni di circo­
stanze particolari o accidentali.
L ’epoca presente, contrassegnata da episodi di disordine economico, politico 
e sociale, diminuisce la fiducia nei confronti della capacità dell’analisi tradizionale 
nel condurre a conclusioni valide e a giudizi normativi adeguati. La validità 
decisionale pare suggerire una impostazione più attenta al contingente in tema 
di politica economica pubblica o privata. Il quadro della situazione da analizzare 
è di estrema importanza, a nostro avviso, a fini di analisi e per il raggiungimento 
della sintesi.
Nel diritto americano la natura contingente della regola di legge può essere 
ritrovata nella distinzione tra la regola in sé e la regola razionale. La regola in 
sé afferma che certe azioni, per esempio la collusione, sono sempre illegali. La 
regola razionale afferma il concetto di giusto e d’ingiusto sulla base delle conse­
guenze rispettive di decisioni alternative. Le decisioni economiche, in particolare, 
hanno a che fare col tempo e l’incertezza del futuro sembra richieda tanto 
forme di pianificazione strategica (ossia valutazioni della macrorealtà del futuro) 
quanto forme di pianificazione sintetica (ossia stime delle diverse microrealtà).
TH E PO LITICA L BUSIN ESS CYCLE 
AND INVESTM ENT FLUCTUATIONS IN  FRANCE
by
J o s e f  C. B r a d a  ( * )
Abstract
'Writers on the political business cycle argue that politicians use 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies prior to elections in order to 
promote prosperity and consequently ensure their reelection. However, 
if the rational expectations hypothesis is correct, the public should become 
aware of this regularity in government policy. In this paper, we employ 
data on France to show that investment falls in electoral years. This 
suggests that French investors recognize that pre-election prosperity is 
artificial and that post-election austerity will reduce the returns on current 
investment.
I. Politicians and Economic Policy
In recent years two new and fruitful avenues of research in macro- 
economic have evolved. One of these is the endogenization of policy 
makers in macroeconomic models. Although the work of Frey and Schneider 
(1975, 1978a,b) represents the most complete empirical endogenization 
of economic policy-making, it is the work of Nordhaus (1975) on the 
political business cycle that seems to have captured the imagination of 
the profession and of the public. The theory of the political business cycle 
developed by Nordhaus and further elaborated by MacRae (1977) assumes 
that politicians will manipulate the economy in such a way as to maximize
(*) Department of Economics, Arizona State University, Tempe, Az. 85287, U.S.A.
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the votes cast for the incumbent party!1). The electorate is assumed to 
respond to prosperity and high levels of employment by voting for the 
party in power. Consequently, in the period preceding an election expan­
sionary monetary and fiscal policy are employed to stimulate the economy. 
After the election, monetary and fiscal policy become restrictive in order 
to deal with the inflationary trends that result from the pre-election boom. 
Thus, policy is to some extent endogenized and tends to be the source of 
economic fluctuations.
The evidence for the existence of a political business cycle is mixed. 
Nordhaus examined unemployment rates for a number of industrialized 
democracies. He found no evidence of such a cycle in Australia, France, 
Japan and the United Kingdom. The pattern of unemployment in Canada, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, New Zealand, Sweden and the United 
States did support Nordhaus’ hypothesis of the existence of a politically 
induced cycle in economic activity. The work of Frey and Schneider for 
the United Kingdom and the United States (1978 a, b) also suggests that 
when the incumbent party’s lead falls below an acceptable level, expan­
sionary monetary and fiscal policies are employed to stimulate the economy. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, they also found that the balance of 
payments situation has an important influence on the willingness of the 
government to employ expansionary policies. Amacher and Boyes (1979, 
1982) also find some evidence of a political business cycle in the United 
States and argue that such cycles are less severe in parliamentary systems 
with variable election periods than in those with fixed electoral intervals.
As at least one writer, McCallum (1978), has pointed out, the 
existence of (though not the incentive for and effort to create) a political 
business cycle is inconsistent with the other new trend in macroeconomics, 
rational expectations!2). McCallum argues that if the rational expectations 
hypothesis holds, « . . .  regular attempts by the authorities to manufacture 
election-time prosperity will be anticipated by private consumers and 
firms, and the real effects negated» (p. 505). McCallum then goes on to 
examine the pattern of unemployment in the United States from 1948 to 
1974 and finds no evidence of a political business cycle. (*)
(*) One can also assume that politicians will behave so as to maximize the probability 
of re-election as do Frey and Ramser (1976). While the long-term implications of such 
behavior are somewhat different, the possibility of a politically inspired-cycle remains.
For a review of the evidence on the relationship between economic conditions and 
voter behavior, see Amacher et al. (1979).
(2) See Muth (1961) and Sargent and Wallace (1975).
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II. Investment and The Political business Cycle
The rational expectations hypothesis does not, as McCallum points 
out, preclude politicians from attempting to manufacture pre-election 
prosperity. Thus it does not invalidate, for example, the findings of Frey 
and Schneider (1978 a, b) that parties in power do indeed resort to 
expansionary policies when their popularity wanes. However, it does imply 
that real output and employment will not be influenced by such expan­
sionary policy, although there may be some monetary consequences. In a 








= C + I + G  
=  a +  b (GNP-T)
=  real output 
=  real consumption 
=  real investment 
=  real government expenditures 
=  real taxes.
Eq. 1
Any anticipated increase in G  will be offset by corresponding decreases 
in C and I  thus negating the effects of the government policy. The objective 
of this paper is to test whether, in fact, such counter-cyclical fluctuations 
exist. Since investment outlays are generally more volatile than consumer 
expenditures we focus on the former (3).
Our hypothesis is that if politicians regularly attempt to stimulate the 
economy prior to elections and if investment decisions reflect knowledge 
of this behavior, then investment should decline during electoral periods. 
This will occur because investors will recognize that current profits and 
operating levels are temporary and will be followed by a post-election 
slump. In contrast if investors do not utilize knowledge about the political 
business cycle, investment outlays should be pro-cyclical, rising with the 
pre-election prosperity. If pre-election declines in investment do exist then 
we can conclude that politicians do attempt to manufacture a political 
business and that investment decisions are guided by rational expectations. 
However, we cannot conclude that counter-cyclical fluctuations in invest­
ment prevent the government from improving business conditions prior 
to elections. On the other hand, if no pre-election declines in investment
(3) Perhaps more important for the purposes of this study is the fact that investment 
decisions reflect to a greater extent than do consumption decisions the expectations of 
economic agents regarding the future state of the economy.
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are evident then either there is no effort to manufacture a political business 
cycle or investors do not make use of the regularity in government fiscal 
and monetary policy to formulate their investment decisions.
III . Empirical Results
To test the hypothesis that investment activity in France has been 
anti-cyclical vis a vis the political business cycle, Equations 2 and 3 were 
estimated for the period 1955-77 (4).
INV =  f (GNP, INT, IN FL, FO RI, ELECT) Eq. 2
INV — f {GNP, RINT, FO RI, ELECT) Eq. 3
where
INV =  
GNP  =  
INT
INFL =  
RINT  =  
FORI =  
ELECT =
gross investment (bill. $) 
gross national product (bill. $) 
nominal short-term interest rate (96) 
annual rate of change of the GNP deflator (96)
INT -  IN FL
capital inflows from abroad (bill. $)
dummy variable =  1 in years of national election, or 
otherwise.
Parameter estimates for Equations 2 and 3 are reported in Table 1. 
Of the economic variables, the coefficient for GNP is positive and significant 
as expected. The interest rate, inflation and capital inflow coefficients are 
not significant at the 5%  level. This is consistent with other findings of 
the relative insensitivity of investment activity to the rate of interest and 
the relatively high ratio of domestic investment to foreign capital inflows.
Of greater importance to our hypothesis is the coefficient for the 
ELECT  variable. In both Equations, the coefficient has a value of —0.71, 
indicating that during an election year investment expenditures are $0.71 
billion less than they would be in a non-election year with the same 
economic climate. Thus our hypothesis that investment behavior is counter­
cyclical vis a vis the political business cycle is confirmed. French investors 
appear to have recognized the proclivity of politicians to attempt to manu­
facture pre-election prosperity and respond, as the rational expectations
(4) Data on economic variables were obtained from OECD, Statistical Yearbook (various 
years) and IMF, International Financial Statistics (various years). Dates of national elections 
were obtained from The Statesman’s Yearbook.
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hypothesis predicts, by reducing the volume of investment outlays. Con­
sequently, Nordhaus’ failure to find in French unemployment data any 
evidence of a political business cycle cannot be construed as a demonstra­
tion that politicians do not attempt to manipulate the economy to their 
advantage. Rather, when combined with the findings of this paper the 
available evidence suggests that while politicians do attempt to manipulate 
the economy, their efforts are frustrated by the reactions of the private 
sector. Although the efforts of politicians to influence the economy in the 
short run are futile, it is important to note that they do have an adverse 
long-term effect on economic welfare. This is because the declines in 
investment caused by politicians’ stimulative efforts are not likely to be 
made up during non-election years. Thus as the result of efforts to manu­
facture a political business cycle, the French capital stock is smaller than 
it would be otherwise and both the level and growth of GNP are also less.
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IL  CICLO POLITICO E LE FLUTTUAZIONI D ELL’INVESTIM ENTO 
IN FRANCIA
La letteratura sul ciclo politico sostiene che i politici tendono ad impiegare 
politiche monetarie e fiscali espansive nei periodi che precedono immediatamente 
un’elezione allo scopo di promuovere prosperità e assicurarsi la rielezione. Nel 
periodo post-elettorale invece la politica economica diviene restrittiva al fine 
di controllare l ’inflazione. D’altro lato la letteratura sulle aspettative razionali 
indica che comportamenti regolari da parte delle pubbliche autorità vengono
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notati dalla gente e influiscono sulla formazione delle previsioni circa le condi­
zioni economiche future.
Se vale dunque la teoria delle aspettative razionali, ceteris paribus, dovrebbe 
verificarsi una caduta del volume d’investimento in epoca pre-elettorale, giacché 
gl’investitori comprendono che al clima economico favorevole sperimentato al 
presente, subentrerà tosto l’austerità post-elettorale a ridimensionare il rendi­
mento degli investimenti. E ’ quanto in effetti sembra avvenire, secondo la 
dimostrazione empirica offerta dall’autore, nel caso francese. Le stime compiute 
in questo lavoro indicano che in Francia, nel periodo 1955-1977, in anni eletto­
rali l’investimento è risultato minore di quanto altrimenti sarebbe stato. Sembra 
dunque che gli investitori anticipino effettivamente gli sforzi dei politici al 
potere per stimolare l’economia presso la scadenza elettorale e di conseguenza 
agiscano in modo da vanificare quegli sforzi.
A CRITICAL VIEW  OF STUDIES EXAM INING 
TH E PERFORMANCE EFFECTS OF TH E SEPARATION 
OF OW NERSHIP FROM CONTROL
by
M i c h a e l  L .  L a w r i w s k y ( * )
Abstract
In this paper a number of criticisms of empirical studies examining 
the separation thesis are raised. Fundamental among these are that most 
previous studies have confined their samples to very large firms, and have 
not tested for the sensitivity of results with respect to firm size and defi­
nition of management control. A sensitivity analysis of Australian data 
reveals that almost any conclusion may be reached depending on the 
samples and definitions employed. It is concluded that even when dif­
ferences in performance are uncovered, little light is shed on the reasons 
for this, hence a new approach is required.
I. Introduction
For some time economists have debated the issue of whether the 
« traditional » theory of the firm needs to be supplemented or supplanted 
by new theories which have speculated on the performance consequences 
of a separation of ownership from control. Both sides presented powerful 
arguments which were founded on observations of real-world processes, 
yet neither seemed to be able to develop a view of the world which could
(*) La Trobe University, Bundora, Victoria (Australia). This paper is based on portions 
of the author’s doctoral dissertation. He would like to thank David Round, Ian McLean and 
John Hatch for their comments, while retaining responsibility for any errors.
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be accepted by the other 0). Clearly, it seemed, further resolution of this 
matter would have to be sought through empirical, rather than theoretical 
debate.
However, empirical studies examining the relationship between con­
trol-type and company performance have not been able to demonstrate a 
clear pattern of behaviour. This, in turn, has spawned a new debate on 
the validity of alternative tests of the central hypotheses. Much of the 
debate has appeared in the pages of this Review C).
In this article a broad critique of studies examining differences in 
performance based on control-type is presented in section II. It is argued 
that a fundamental weakness of these studies is that sensitivity analyses 
in relation to firm size and definition of management control have not been 
undertaken. Section III  illustrates this argument employing a sample of 
Australian corporations. Section IV summarizes the results, and concludes 
that a new empirical approach is required.
II. Empirical Tests of the Separation Thesis
Most studies examining the separation thesis have shown that owner 
controlled firms have yielded higher profitability, but the difference has 
often been statistically or economically insignificant. The only exceptions 
to this rule (i.e. where management controlled firms have been more 
profitable) have been found in situations where firms have had low market 
power (Ware [5 2 ] ; Sorenson [4 9 ]), or where, as in West Germany, 
financial institutions have played a significant role in the affairs of industrial 
corporations (Thonet and Poensgen [51 ]). Of the studies examining firm 
growth, most have found that there was no statistically significant difference 
based on control-type. However, it is important to note that those 
studies which have found owner controlled firms to be significantly more 
profitable (Radice [4 1 ] ; McEachern [2 8 ]) also found owner-controlled 
firms to grow at a significantly faster rate (Radice [4 1 ] ; McEachern [29 ]). 
In other words, where strong and statistically significant differences in 
more than one performance variable have emerged, the relationship 
between these has not been unusual from an economic standpoint.
(1) In this debate the leading proponents of the managerial theories were Baumol 
[3, 4], Marris [27] and G albraith [12], while the leading critics were Baldwin [2 ], 
Meade [31], Solow [47 ,48] and Machlup [26].
(1 2) For example, see Kamerschen [20 ,21], Palmer [38], Round [42], Cooper [11] 
and Lawriwsky and Round [25].
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Similarly, studies examining risk performance have yielded mixed 
conclusions. But those studies which have examined both risk and profi­
tability, and found that significantly higher profits were earned by owner 
controlled firms (Boudreaux [6 ] ;  McEachern [2 8 ]), also found that these 
owner controlled firms were significantly more risky. The same relation also 
holds for retentions and control-type. For instance, when McEachern 
([2 8 ], p. 47) reworked Sorenson’s [49 ] data excluding low entry barrier 
industries he showed that management controlled firms in the remaining 
sample earned significantly lower profits, and had a significantly higher 
payout ratio than owner controlled firms. In his own sample McEachern 
[28] found that his «owner managed» firms, which were significantly 
more profitable than management controlled firms, also had a significantly 
lower payout ratio.
Grabowski and Mueller [14] have argued that owner controlled 
firms will on average tend to be younger, and have higher investment oppor­
tunities than management controlled firms. If this were the case then 
findings that owner controlled firms have higher profits associated with 
higher growth, risk and retentions could not be interpreted as providing 
support for the separation thesis. Yet only McEachern [28] attempted to 
control for this possibility by including a firm age variable in his analysis.
The managerial theories were concerned with large firms operating 
with some degree of monopoly power. Accordingly, many studies have 
employed samples composed of large firms, usually the top 200 or 500 US 
non-financial corporations. Palmer [37 ] limited his sample even further 
by separating out firms with high entry barriers in their major industry, 
and Holl [17] confined his study to those management controlled firms 
which in addition could evade the discipline of the market for corporate 
control. In these studies owner controlled firms were found to earn 
significantly higher profits. On the other hand, studies employing a much 
larger sample (e.g. Kania and McKean [22 ]), found no significant diffe­
rences. But without including a wide range of company sizes and examining 
for control-type effects within different size categories, it is difficult 
to conclude that any differences in performances were dependent on 
control-type per se. The differences might, for example, have come 
about through « survivorability ». That is, within a sample of very large 
corporations, any remaining owner controlled companies would need to be 
exceptional, since in order to grow to that size while retaining ownership 
control new equity issues would need to be limited, and more debt incurred. 
Such doubts have been raised by Radice [41] and Steer and Cable [5 0 ], 
but no formal tests of the proposition have been undertaken.
Another problem with past studies is that they have assumed that 
owners, many of which are also managers, do not derive non-pecuniary 
benefits from the performance of their firm. Knight [23 ] and Schumpeter 
[45] recognised that «empire building» even at the expense of profits, 
may be associated with the egos of owner-managers. Other theorists have 
also made this observation (e.g. Gordon [1 3 ] ; Marris [2 7 ] ; Nichols [3 5 ]; 
Mueller [3 3 ]), but only McEachern [28] has formally incorporated it in 
an empirical model.
Several studies separated firms into « ultimate control» categories. 
Under such a classification scheme if a firm is controlled by another com­
pany through a substantial shareholding, which in turn is controlled by 
a third company, the control-type of the last holding company would be 
assigned to the first two. But it can by no means be taken for granted that 
the incentives and constraints faced by decision makers within a particular 
company controlled firm are identical to those in the controlling, or parent 
organization. In fact, Nyman and Silberston ([3 6 ], p. 94) have argued that 
in such firms managerial discretion would be severely limited. It was also 
reasoned that significant holdings by financial institutions would limit 
managerial discretion, but (as far as I am aware) no published study has 
attempted to test this proposition.
There has been some disagreement as to what proportion of share­
holdings is necessary to constitute control over a corporation, and different 
studies have used varying definitions. Probably the most prevalent definition 
of ownership control has been that ten per cent of voting stock be held by 
a small group of «re lated » individuals (e.g. Kamerschen, [1 9 ] ; Larner, 
[2 4 ]; Palmer, [3 7 ]). Other studies have tested for differences in the per­
formance of two extreme control groups, variously defined (e.g. Monsen, 
Chiu and Cooley, [3 2 ] ; Radice, [4 1 ]; Boudreaux, [7 ]) . But none of the 
previous studies has presented a sensitivity analysis of their results em­
ploying alternative definitions of management control.
Another controversy surrounds the choice of the appropriate perfor­
mance indicator. There has been a debate in the industrial organization 
literature over whether sales-based or capital-based measures of profita­
bility give the best indications of allocative efficiency!3). The ownership 
and control studies have been divided as to whether a capital-based rate 
of return (on equity or net assets) is superior to an ex-post market rate of 
return (i.e. the return to an investor from dividends and capital gains). 
A problem with the market return figure is that it depends partially on
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(3) For example, see Bain ([1 ], pp. 386-394) and Scherer ([44], p. 80).
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market expectations and may be more independent of managerial actions. 
On the other hand capital based returns are subject to the vagaries of 
creative accounting. Both are subject to the criticism that risk dimension 
is not incorporated. It has been argued that the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM) will yield a risk adjusted market rate of return (Bothwell, [5 ]) . 
However, as Hindley ([1 5 ] , p. 214) has pointed out, the market may be 
expected to capitalize the anticipated effects of control-type. Any differences 
on the basis of control-type which are observed then, may be due to 
« changes in the level of managerial usurpation », or to a change in the 
control position which has gone unnoticed by the researcher in question.
Finally, caution should be exercised in making international com­
parisons of studies seeking to uncover performance consequences of the 
separation of ownership from control. Chandler [9 ] stressed that cultural, 
social and legal differences between the US and European countries have 
been responsible for chronological disparities in the emergence of mana­
gerial capitalism. For example, it was noted that,
« In Europe . . .  Families identified themselves more closely with the 
firm that provided the income with which to maintain their status than 
did families in the United States . . .  [and where] the owners hired middle 
managers to co-ordinate flows, the family continued to dominate top 
management. Often the family preferred not to expand the enterprise if 
it meant the loss of personal control» ( [9 ] , p. 500). I.
III . A Sensitivity Analysis Employing Australian Data
(a) The Data
The ownership and control data are based on a sample of 226 cor­
porations listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange over the period 1965/66 
to 1974/75. It was drawn randomly from a group of 317 non-mining, non­
finance, non-development and contracting companies appearing in the Statex 
Investment Service. However, only continuously listed companies are 
included, and those in which another corporation held more than 15 per 
cent of ordinary shares have been excluded. This yields a final sample 
of 142 companies.
The ownership data are the most comprehensive (for a sample of this 
size) ever to be compiled in Australia, and are the result of a thorough 
examination of the share registers of more than 2,000 private companies 
and investment trusts. Financial variables (apart from firm size) are averages 
over the period 1966/67 to 1974/75, and employ the same definitions that
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were used by Singh and Whittington [46 ] in their exhaustive study of 
UK firms.
With regard to firm maturity, Grabowski and Mueller [14] employed 
a classification scheme based on chronological age (firms beginning after 
1945) and product structure (firms in which more than 50 per cent of 
products produced did not exist prior to 1945) to identify non-mature 
firms. In the Australian case 1939, the beginning of World War II  was 
considered to be significant as a point of demarcation. World War II 
provided a considerable stimulus to Australia’s manufacturing industries. 
Australia suddenly found itself to be a major source of supply for British 
Commonwealth countries east of Suez. Thus, during the war period and 
in the decades following, many new industries utilizing new technologies 
were begun. « New » firms which were created to takeover the productive 
assets of a concern which had originated before 1939 were classified as 
mature, while firms established by « mature » overseas corporations after 
that date were classified as non-mature in the Australian environment. To 
take account of chronologically old firms which had managed to reverse 
life-cycle forces the company histories of all « mature» firms in the 
Sydney Stock Exchange Investment Service Sheets were examined. Where 
it could be established that major re-organisation had been experienced 
during or after World War II  these companies were re-classified as 
non-mature.
(b) The Model
We shall define four alternative definitions of management control — 
denoted MCi, MCi, MC3 and MC4 — all of which have been employed in 
previous studies. Specifically, the definition of these four dummy variables 
are as follows!4),
=  1 for firms where directors and related interests held less 
than 5% of shares
=  0 if directors and related interests held more than 5% of 
shares
(4) Note that definitions MC3 and MC4 necessitate a reduction in sample size. In 
MCi we eliminate firms in which directors and related interests held between 5% and 15% 
of shares, while in MC4 we eliminate management controlled firms (with less than 10% 
ownership) which did not evade market discipline. Definition of the latter follows closely 
that employed by Holl [17]. That is, firms which had below (industry) average valuation 
ratios in 1966/67 to 1968/69 and did not move closer to their industry average in 1972/73 
to 1974/75 were considered to be evading market discipline.
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=  1 for firms where directors and related interests held less
than 10% of shares
=  0 if directors and related interests held more than 10% of 
shares
=  1 for firms where directors and related interests held less
than 5% of shares
=  0 if directors and related interests held more than 15% of 
shares
=  1 for firms where directors and related interests held less
than 10% of shares and were able to evade the discipline 
of the market for corporate control
=  0 if directors and related interests held more than 10% of 
shares.
In previous studies two of the most frequently used indicators of 
performance have been the rate of return on net worth (equity assets) 
and the growth rate of the firm. Most tests have taken the form of regressing 
these performance measures against a dummy variable reflecting manage­
ment control. Differences in environmental conditions have been accounted 
for by the inclusion of industry dummies, firm size and/or industry barriers 
to entry variables.
As estimates of industry barriers to entry at the firm level were not 
available (5), the original model was of the form,
P =  Po +  PiMCj +  % ' z 6 ID, +  3„SIZ E  +  pu NMAT +  e (1)
* = 2  1=2
where,
P is performance, measured alternatively as REA (post-tax rate of
return on equity assets) and GNA (growth rate of net assets) over 
the period 1966-67 to 1974-75
MCj is the management control dummy, where j ~  1 . . .  4
ID2 . . . ID,e are industry dummy variables, where ID, Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco) =  0, ID, =  1 otherwise etc.
(®) Recently Parry and Watson [39] have estimated a « cost disadvantage ratio »
(Best-X MES) for 4-digit manufacturing industries in Australia. Round [42] argued that 
this measure — while theoretically superior to minimum efficient scale proxies developed 
by Comanor and Wilson [10] or Caves, K halilzadeh-Shirazi and Porter [8] — still 
suffers from significant multicollinearity with market concentration. However, to apply this 
measure at the firm level would require detailed information on what industry weightings 
to apply to each firm.
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SIZE
NMAT
ß o . . .  ßl 9  
E
is firm size, defined as the reciprocal of net assets in 1966 (NÀ0) (6)
is the firm maturity dummy, assigned a value of 1 when the firm 
is non-mature and 0 otherwise
are constants
is the stochastic error term.
However, when the 2-digit industry dummy variables were included 
in our regressions only one was significant at the .05 level using a two- 
tailed test. This industry, Textiles, had significantly lower profitability and 
growth. Since the inclusion of the industry dummies did not materially 
affect the size or significance of the coefficient on MQ  these were dropped 
from the equation. There is no real theoretical justification for including 
a Textile dummy as this industry was composed of a roughly equal number 
of management and owner-controlled firms. Consequently the model 
reduces to, P =  ßo +  ß iMC, + &SIZE + ß3NMAT + e . (2)
Following the usual empirical interpretation of the « alternative 
theories » we are testing the hypotheses that, (a) management-controlled 
firms will earn a lower rate of return than owner-controlled firms, and (b) 
management controlled firms will grow at a faster rate than owner-con­
trolled firms. Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses are Ho: 
Pi =  0, H I: Pi <  0 in the profitability equation and Ho: Pi =  0, H i: 
Pi >  0 in the growth equation. No a priori hypothesis is made regarding 
the sign on the SIZE  coefficient, since the effects of economies of scale 
and market power might be countered by X-inefficiency and with pursuit 
of alternative objective to profit maximization. When reviewing Radice’s 
«surprising» results Grabowski and Mueller ([1 4 ], p. 405) offered a 
« life-cycle» interpretation, arguing that, on average, the management- 
controlled firms will tend to be more mature and have lower investment 
opportunities. Therefore, on this count one would expect to find higher 
profit and growth rates among owner-controlled firms.
(c) Empirical Results
The application of equation (2) to the entire sample yielded a 
surprising result. Management-controlled firms were shown to be both 
more profitable and growing faster than owner-controlled firms. Statistical
(6) The reciprocal of net assets was found to provide the best « explanation» of 
profitability and growth, which in the case of profitability is supported by findings of an 
earlier Australian study (Ph illips [40]).
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significance at the .05 level was achieved in every case, except when MCt 
was employed as the definition of management-control. But, as McEachern 
(1978, p. 492) has recently reiterated, the « ‘ new theories ’ . . .  argue that 
in addition to there being a separation of ownership from control managers 
must also be relatively free from the product-market constraint. . .  and 
this environment is characterized by large firms in less than competitive 
industries». Thus a supporter of the managerialist hypothesis would 
discount this unusual result, and insist on a separate test being conducted 
on the large firms sub-sample.
In fact our sample was stratified into three size categories, and the 
curvilinear SIZE  variable in equation (2) was replaced by a linear variable, 
NAo, the value of net assets in 1966. The « large firms » size category 
was composed of firms with opening assets exceeding $20 million in 
1966 (7). This corresponds to the Top 100 Australian companies at that 
time. In proportionate terms, however, this group is roughly comparable 
to the Top 500 in the US and the Top 200 in the UK, which have been 
the primary subjects of research on ownership and control in those countries. 
The « small firms » category was composed of firms with net assets of less 
than $5 million in 1966.
A summary of the sensitivity analysis is provided in Table 1 which 
shows the coefficients and « t ratios » obtained on the management-control 
dummy variables in the three size categories. Considering first the rate of 
return on equity (REA) column in the Large firms sample we find that the 
negative signs attached to the management-control dummies support the 
managerialist position. However, the negative coefficients in the growth 
equations (GNA) run counter to the managerial prediction. Also, the 
explanatory power was quite low (R2 ranged from .086, to .182 when 
MC3 was employed). The MC3 definition of management control is similar 
to that employed in many US studies, and the result is not unlike that 
found by, say, Kamerschen [19] or Larner [2 4 ]. The MC3 definition 
approximates most closely the definition employed by Radice [4 1 ], whose 
sample consisted of large UK firms. This definition has the effect of elimi­
nating what Radice termed « transitional » control-types those in which 
the cohesive ownership group holds between 5%  and 15% of issued shares. 
Here the coefficient indicates that management-controlled firms earned a 
rate of return on equity assets which was 1.5 percentage points less than
(7) The choice of a $20 million net assets cut-off point to distinguish « large firms » is 
not as arbitrary as it seems. These firms had several performance characteristics which clearly 
distinguished them from smaller companies.
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T able 1.
SUMMARY: SENSITIVITY OF MC COEFFICIENT TO FIRM SIZE AND 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL
\  F irm  
N . Size
Sm all M edium Large
C ontrol
Type

















































Notes: a, b and c denote significance at the .01, .05 and .10 levels respectively using a 
one-tail test for the Large firms sample, and a two-tail test for the Small and 
Medium-sized firms samples.
that earned by owner-controlled firms. But at the same time management- 
controlled firms grew at a lower rate — 2.4 per cent lower — than did 
owner-controlled firms. The conclusion is not unlike that reported by 
Radice.
The fourth definition of management control, MC<, is similar to the 
one used by Holl [17 ] in the US. There we are testing Holl’s hypothesis 
that management-controlled firms which can avoid the constraint of the 
market for corporate control, and have a significant degree of market 
power, will earn a lower rate of return than will owner controlled firms 
in a similar position of market power. The bias inherent in stating the 
managerialist hypothesis in this way can be seen by comparing coefficients 
on the control-type dummy variables MC2 and AfC*. In the former case, 
which employs the same definition of management-control based on 
ownership structure, the profitability of management-controlled firms is 
1.1 percentage points below that of owner-controlled firms. Larner [24 ] 
would argue that this difference is not very important in economic terms, 
and it is only barely statistically significant at .10 level using a one-tail test. 
Yet in the equation employing MCt, management-controlled firms are seen 
to earn a rate of return 2.3 percentage points less than owner controlled 
firms, and this difference is significant at the .01 level. Holl did not test 
the proposition that growth rates of firms differed according to his defi­
nition of control-type. However, our results show that these (AfC4) mana­
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gement-controlled firms, as well as earning lower profits, grew less rapidly. 
The influence of firm size on the profitability of these large firms was 
extremely weak, but size was generally negatively associated with growth 
and on one occasion the size coefficient was significant at the .10 level 
using a two-tailed test.
Thus, we have found that among the very largest firms in the economy, 
depending on the definition employed, management controlled firms are 
shown to be: a) about as profitable as owner controlled firms ( M G ) ;  
b) significantly less profitable at the .10 level ( M G ) ;  c) significantly less 
profitable at the .05 level ( M G ) ;  or d) significantly less profitable at the 
.01 level ( M G ) .  The choice, it seems, is up to the researcher.
Before discussing medium and small-sized firms a digression on the 
behaviour of the maturity dummy would appear to be in order. For large 
firms the coefficient relating to NMAT in the profitability equations were 
all positive and significant at the .10 level. In absolute terms the effect 
of non-maturity on the average rate of return on equity assets ranged 
from 1.7 percentage points to 2.4 percentage points. In the growth 
equations all the coefficients on the maturity dummy had the expected 
positive sign and were about twice as great as the effect on profitability. 
However, statistical significance was not achieved. One reason for the lack 
of statistical significance of the NMAT coefficient in the growth equations, 
and the relatively low /-values in the profitability equations may be the 
small number of observations. Only three of the 38 large firms sample 
were classified as non-mature. Another reason is that we should expect 
non-mature firms to earn higher marginal rates of return. Thus, Mueller 
([3 3 ] , p. 675) has argued that « while the correlation between average and 
marginal rates of return among firms is undoubtedly positive, enough 
white noise is probably introduced into the data by using the former 
as a proxy for the desired marginal rates, that the significance of this type 
of test [of the growth maximization hypothesis] is placed in some doubt».
The profitability and growth performance of medium sized and small 
owner and management-controlled firms are now compared. Since the 
managerialist literature argues that in smaller firms (where competitive 
pressures are likely to be more intense) managers will have little oppor­
tunity to divert potential profits, two-tailed « / » tests are performed on 
the coefficients of the control-type dummies. Medium sized firms are 
defined as those which had net assets of between $5 million and $20 million 
in 1966. The results show that in terms of both profitability and growth, 
management-controlled firms outperformed owner-controlled firms. In terms 
of profitability management-controlled firms earned a rate of return on
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equity assets which was, depending on the definition used, between 1.0 
and 2.7 percentage points higher. Furthermore, this difference was, with 
the exception of (MC*), always significant at the .05 level or better. Also, 
the growth rates of management-controlled firms were always at least 
3.2 percentage points higher than those of owner-controlled firms, and 
these differences were significant at the .05 level on one occasion (MC 1), 
and at the .10 level with alternative definitions.
It is interesting to note that while the profitability of management- 
controlled firms which were able to evade the discipline of the market 
for corporate control (MC*) was not significantly greater than that achieved 
by owner-controlled firms, the growth rate achieved by these management- 
controlled firms was significantly higher at the .10 level. This may indeed 
indicate that such management-controlled firms were pursuing growth at 
the expense of higher profitability. However, to conduct such a test on its 
own would be dubious practice, since the specification of management- 
control biases the result from the start. In general the signs on the coef­
ficients of NMAT are positive as hypothesized, but statistical significance 
is not found. Firm size (measured by opening net assets) always had a 
negative influence on profitability and growth, but the coefficients were 
never significant.
The next two columns of Table 1 show the results of a similar 
analysis carried out on the small firms sample — those with net assets of 
less than $5 million in 1966. In general management-control again has 
positive effects on profitability and growth, but now the only statistically 
significant differences are in profit rates. Under definitions MC2 and MC3 
management-controlled firms earned higher rates of return which were 
significant at the .05 and .10 levels respectively. The maturity dummy 
variable is again positive in the majority of cases but never statistically 
significant. However, the negative influence of firm size on profitability 
and growth (not shown) was now strong and generally statistically signi­
ficant at the .01 level.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
In sum, our sensitivity analysis has yielded the following results:
a) Whatever results are obtained in attempts to assess the effects of 
control-type on firm performance, these are quite sensitive to the defi­
nition of management-control employed. In light of this it is curious 
that no previous researcher has undertaken such a sensitivity analysis (8).
(8) The one exception to this rule was the limited analysis carried out by H oll [16].
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b ) In « large » firms characterized by a high degree of market power, 
owner-controlled firms earned significantly higher rates of return on 
equity assets (although the level of significance varied depending on 
the definition of management-control which was used), and higher 
rates of growth of net assets (although the differences were not 
statistically significant).
c ) Among «medium sized» firms the reverse was true, since management- 
controlled firms earned significantly higher rates of profit, and achieved 
significantly higher growth rates.
d ) In the « small » firms sample management-controlled firms again 
achieved higher profitability and growth, although a statistically signi­
ficant difference in profits at the .05 level was found only when 
MC2 was used as the definition of management-control.
e) On the whole, the highest /-values were achieved when AiCu'was used 
as the definition distinguishing management from owner-controlled 
firms which implies that ownership of ten per cent of shares was most 
critical in determining performance, although we have not determined 
why it was critical.
The findings are consistent with those of an earlier exploratory in­
vestigation of large Australian companies conducted by Round [4 2 ]. 
Similarly, they are consistent with the findings of several US and UK 
studies. They highlight the blinkered view that results from restricting 
samples only to large corporation, and of reliance on a single definition 
of control.
Another important point to emerge from our findings is the apparent 
interaction effect between firm size and control-type. The size cut-off 
point employed by most previous studies has probably precluded the 
discovery of such an effect. However, this effect was found to be significant 
in the French study conducted by Jacquemin and Ghellinck [1 8 ]. Their 
most substantial finding was that firm size had a significantly greater positive 
influence on the profitability of « Familial » companies. From their results 
one concludes that among the largest of the Top 200 in France, owner- 
controlled firms are more profitable, while at the lower range, management 
controlled firms were more profitable. No substantial explanation of this 
« anomaly » was provided.
Even when considerable differences in performance have been un­
covered, most previous studies have shed little light on the fundamental 
question of why the observed differences came about. Thus, upon disco­
vering that the owner-controlled firms in their sample earned higher rates
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of return Monsen, Chiu and Cooley [32 ] qualified their findings in the 
following terms:
« While our tests show clearly the differences in performance between 
owner controlled and management controlled firms, they do not, of 
course, explain why such performance occurs. The hypothesis that seems 
most convincing to us is that two quite different motivation systems are 
at work — one for owners and another for managers » (pp. 441-2).
This approach followed a rather indirect course. It made a judgement 
about the motivation of managers in companies depending on the dispersion 
of shareholdings in those companies. Supporting studies relating to the 
linkages between managerial compensation and corporate performance 
were used to buttress the resulting hypothesis. This was that in firms 
with a dominant stockholder (owner-controlled firms) managers could be 
expected to « maximize shareholder welfare», while in firms without a 
dominant stockholder (management controlled firms) managers would be 
free to pursue their own interests at the expense of the shareholders.
The researchers following this approach have, without exception, 
made the implicit assumption that motivation and the internal factors 
restraining its expression have been homogeneous within the « control 
groups » identified. Thus, differences in motivations and restraints within 
these groups have been ignored, and in general only variables reflecting 
the restraint imposed by the produce market have been used to control 
for external influences. This suggests that future research should, instead, 
proceed from the direct identification of the incentives and restraints, both 
internal and external to the firm, which interact in determining its 
performance.
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UNA VISIONE CRITICA DEGLI STUDI CIRCA GLI EFFETTI PRA­
TICI DELLA SEPARAZIONE DI PROPRIETÀ’ E CONTROLLO
Scopo del lavoro è quello di criticare il modo spesso tenuto dagli studi 
empirici che prendono in esame la tesi della separazione della proprietà dal 
controllo. Tale tesi di carattere generale ha dato origine, com’è noto, a una 
letteratura teorica importante, la quale riconosceva tuttavia doversi in ultima 
analisi riguardare il problema della sua natura di questione empirica. La que­
stione empirica non ha tuttavia potuto esser trattata e risolta in maniera 
soddisfacente e convincente. La ragione di ciò risiede secondo l’autore, in 
una debolezza fondamentale degli studi empirici in materia, debolezza che riguarda 
la definizione di controllo e l’analisi di sensitività in rapporto alla dimensione 
d’impresa.
Un caso analizzato su dati australiani dimostra come sia possibile raggiun­
gere qualsiasi conclusione a seconda del tipo di campione utilizzato e della 
definizione prescelta.
I risultati qui ottenuti confermano quanto messo in luce anche da altri 
studi critici dell’argomento e, in aggiunta, consentono di comprendere le ragioni 
dello stato insoddisfacente della ricerca empirica su questo tema centrale per 
l’economia dell’impresa. Il lavoro si conclude dunque con la proposta di una 
diversa e nuova impostazione per questi studi empirici.
A NO TE ON EATW ELL, LLEW ELLYN AND TA RLIN G  
W AGE IN FLA TIO N  M ODEL
by
D a n i e l e  S c h i l i r ö ( * )
Abstract
The article is simply an exercise of applied econometrics, that aims 
at answering the following question: can the results of Eatwell - Llewellyn - 
Tarling money wage inflation model in industrial countries up until 1967 
be replicated for period 1968 to 1972?
The paper was presented at Cambridge as an essay topic in econo­
metrics for the M. Phil, program in 1980.
1 . Eatwell, Llewellyn, Tarling article
The Review of Economic Studies published in 1974 an article by 
Eatwell, Llewellyn and Tarling (ELT) on «Money Wage Inflation in 
Industrial Countries». The article consists of an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between average rates of growth of earnings and sectoral 
productivity in the manufacturing sectors of fifteen industrial economies 
over the period 1958-1967.
The ELT study takes as its starting point the so called « key-industry » 
hypothesis, based on the observed intersectoral homogeneity of wage 
growth rates in manufacturing and on the long term stability of wage 
differentials. The «key-industry» hypothesis supposes that there exists
(*) University of Messina.
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a « key » or « guidepost» sector of industry which determines the overall 
rate of growth of money wages.
The traditional view !1) attempts to explain the growth of money 
wages in this « guidepost » sector in terms of variables such as employment 
and the rate of profit. Another variant of this hypothesis, the «N ord ic» 
view, takes the «k e y »  sector to be the tradeables’ sector(1 2).
The ELT view is a generalization of Kaldor (1959), who suggests that 
the « key » sector may be identified with the magnitude of the rate of 
growth of productivity. ELT maintain that « the ‘ key ’ group need not be 
a specific and unchanging sector of the economy, but may be the group 
which, over any particular period of time, dominates the economy in 
terms of the explanatory variable, productivity grow th»!3).
Underlying this composite hypothesis, is the behavioural assumption 
that the « key » industries spend a high proportion of their large produc­
tivity gains in the form of higher wage payments, and that these gains 
are neither absorbed by higher profits, nor by substantial price cutting. 
The reason for this is to be found in the realms of the oligopolistic pricing 
strategy and industrial relations characterized by strong trade unions.
It is worth noting that the ELT study is a long-term analysis and is 
concerned with the long-term ( « systematic») influences on the overall 
rate of growth of money wages. The study abstracts from short-term 
(« special») influences. The econometric test conducted by ELT consists 
of a cross-country study of the relationship between average rates of growth 
of earnings (4) and of productivity in the manufacturing sectors of the 15 
major industrial economies for which sufficient disaggregated data was 
available. The data is assembled in cross-section and is shown in table A (5). 
Where w is the average of the rates of growth of earnings in the 20 (two 
digit level of disaggregation) (6) industries; p is the average of the rates 
of growth of productivity in the 20 industries; Zz is the rate of growth 
of productivity in the top three industries.
(1) See O. Eckstein and T. Wilson, 1962 [2 ]; and O. E ckstein, 1964 [3],
(2) See G. Edgren, O. Faxen and C. E. Odhner, 1969, [4].
(3) See J . E atwell, J .  L lewellyn and R. Tarling, op. cit., p. 516.
(4) Earnings are used, rather than wages, because of the importance of plant-level 
bargaining.
(6) See ELT, op. cit., p. 520.
(®) See Appendix.
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Table A
AVERAGE RATES OF GROWTH OF EARNING, PRODUCTIVITY, AND 
PRODUCTIVITY IN « T O P »  INDUSTRIES, 15 COUNTRIES, 1958-1967
W P z 3
Japan 9.88 7.92 11.86
Israel 9.48 5.67 10.54
Netherlands 9.32 4.61 6.30
W. Germany 8.86 4.54 10.64
Denmark 8.64 4.31 10.37
Sweden 8.10 5.52 10.08
Finland 7.46 4.73 8.60
Ireland 7.22 3.88 6.76
France 6.83 4.16 8.14
Norway 6.79 3.74 7.67
Belgium 6.36 4.34 6.20
U.K. 6.11 2.93 6.65
Canada 4.14 2.72 4.93
New Zealand 3.84 3.32 5.93
USA 3.18 3.61 6.04
The equation tested is the following:
w =  a +  ¿>Z3 . n =  15
or «  =  14
The null hypothesis is H0: b =  0 versus H \:b  *  0 .
They found b to be 0.86 (» =  14) and 0.76 (» =  15), i.e. significantly 
non-zero. R2 =  0.83 (« =  14) and R2 =  0.612 (« =  15).
2. 0 « r  Analysis
The purpose of this paper has been to accept the ELT combined 
wage-leadership hypothesis and to test its validity for the successive period, 
1968-1972. We chose to limit our test-period to five years in order to 
avoid the effects of the sudden fourfold increase in oil prices, following
332 D A N IELE SC H ILIR Ò
the Yom Kippur War of 1973. We realise, of course, that in the period 
under consideration there were the following important facts:
a) widespread acceleration of increases in unit labour costs in industrial 
countries;
b) breakdown of the international monetary system and abandonment 
of the system of fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates in 1971;
c) rapid increase in food and raw material prices in 1972.
Nevertheless, it has been our intention to see just how far the ELT 
hypothesis would hold under such circumstances.
Closely following the ELT approach, we have collected and ordered 
similar series on earnings and productivity (7) . Tables I and II give the 
intersectoral productivity and earnings growth rates for the fifteen countries; 
from these two tables we have derived table III , which corresponds to 
table A.
In comparing tables A and III , two differences are striking. First, 
the average rates of growth of earnings in table A are all single-figure 
magnitudes, whilst thirteen out of fifteen observations in table I II  are 
two digit figures.
Secondly, we notice that the ordering of countries has changed. 
Countries such as Ireland, Belgium and the U.K. moved up from countries 
with low growth of earnings to countries with an high growth of 
earnings (8).
We discovered, furthermore, that in six out of the fifteen countries 
(Canada, Finland, Israel, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) all three of 
the « top » industries changed with respect to the previous period. At a 
glance the new ‘ dinamic ’ sectors appear to be more labour or skill intensive.
The values for productivity growth in the « top » industries in the 
period 1968-72 do not change dramatically, although there has been an 
overall increase; (the mean of Z3 for the fifteen countries in table A is 
8.04, whereas in table I II  it is 9.78).
We tested the ELT hypothesis by means of the OLS estimator. 
The equation is
w =  a +  bZ3. for «  =  14, «  =  15
(7) For details on sources and procedures adopted, see Appendix.
(8) It is interesting to note that the Netherlands now exhibit the expected relation - 
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T able III.
AVERAGE RATES OF GROWTH OF EARNINGS, OF PRODUCTIVITY AND OF 
PRODUCTIVITY IN  « T O P »  INDUSTRIES, 15 COUNTRIES; 1968-1972
w P
Japan 15.75 7.45 12.37
Ireland 14.54 2.94 8.54
Belgium 12.75 4.06 10.21
Netherlands 12.60 7.50 13.13
Finland 12.12 4.70 14.63
U.K. 11.59 2.27 6.52
Denmark 11.04 4.92 9.32
New Zealand 10.90 3.59 7.33
Israel 10.70 7.18 14.03
W. Germany 10.64 3.59 7.51
Sweden 10.40 4.71 9.15
Norway 10.19 3.52 7.52
France 10.04 6.16 8.50
Canada 8.63 4.52 8.23
USA 6.28 3.23 9.82
w is the average of the rates of growth of earnings in the 20 industries given in Table I; 
p is the average of the rates of growth of productivity in the 20  industries given in Table II ;
Z3 is the average of the rates of growth of productivity in the « to p » three industries 
of each country taken from Table II.
Source: see Tables I and II.
The results are as follows:
to =  8.65 +  0.26 Z3 
(2 .35) (0 .23)
tv — 8.84 +  0.24 Z3 
(2 .55) (0 .26)
The values in brackets are standard errors.
The results obtained from using the ELT hypothesis for the period 
1968-1972 are disappointing. There may be reason to believe that the 
effect of the so-called «special factors», described as «once and for 
a ll»  (ELT, op. cit., p. 515) may indeed have been more than transient.
R2 =  0.0179 
n =  14
R2 =  0.0122 
n =  15
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There are a number of explanations to the wage explosion of 1968-69 (*). 
We have no preferred explanation to offer and therefore we do not 
suggest any alternative testable hypothesis.
APPENDIX
This appendix indicates the sources from which the raw data have been 
obtained and the procedures adopted in order to obtain the final values shown 
in tables I, II, III.
Sources
1. U.N. publication: «Growth of World Industry Tables - Volume 1: 
Central Industrial Statistics », 1973 edition.
This volume provides the index numbers of industrial production (base 
year 1970) for individual industries (New ISIC) and the number of employees 
(in thousands) for the same industries.
2. I.L.O. publication: « Yearbook for Labour Statistics », 1973 and 1974 
editions.
These volumes provide the series of average hourly earnings by industry 
for the fifteen different countries.
Precise definitions of each individual series are given in the sources. 
Procedures
The first problem was to match the old ISIC digit industries classification 
with the new ISIC, which gives a three digit industries classification. Thus, 
we had to combine, for example, the 371 Iron and Steel Industry with 372 
Non-Ferrous Metals in order to obtain the two digit Basic Metal industry.
When index numbers of industrial production were to be combined, we 
accepted their respective value added in factor values as weights.
Next, the index numbers of productivity (as the ratio between output and 
employment) and average hourly earnings in each industry were calculated for 
each year, from 1968 to 1972 (base year 1970) and average hourly earnings 
in each industry were calculated for each year, from 1968 to 1972 (base year 
1970), in all the fifteen countries.
From these index numbers the average rates of growth for the period 
1968-1972 were computed in the following way: first, we derived the annual 
rates of change of productivity and earnings for the years 1968-1972, then 
we calculated the arithmetic mean of these annual rates (10).
(9) For a good survey and discussion, see W. Nordhaus, 1972, [7] and see also N. 
K aldor, 1976, [6],
(10) The series of index numbers of productivity and earnings are available from 
the author.
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NOTA SUL MODELLO D ’INFLAZIONE DA SALARI DI EATWELL, 
LLEWELLYN E TARLING
La Review of Economie Studies ha pubblicato nel 1974 un articolo di 
tre economisti dell’Università di Cambridge, J. Eatwell, J. Llewellyn e R. 
Tarling (ELT) intitolato « L ’inflazione da salari monetari nei paesi industriali ».
L ’articolo di ELT è un’analisi empirica della relazione fra i saggi medi 
di crescita dei guadagni monetari dei lavoratori e quelli della produttività 
settoriale nei settori del manifatturiero di 15 paesi industriali nel periodo 
1958-1967.
Tutta l’analisi si basa sulla cosiddetta ipotesi dell’industria « chiave », in 
quanto si suppone che esista un settore « chiave » della industria che determina 
il saggio complessivo di crescita dei salari monetari. ELT si propongono di 
evidenziare soprattutto gli aspetti di lungo periodo del comportamento della 
variabile « salari monetari ».
Il presente lavoro è un semplice esercizio ecorìometrico che si propone 
di verificare se i risultati ottenuti da ELT con il loro modello di inflazione 
da salari per il periodo 1958-1967 si possono replicare per il quinquennio 
successivo, cioè dal 1968 al 1972.
O LECH ’S THEOREM  AND TH E GLOBAL STA BILITY OF 
W ALRASIAN PRICE ADJUSTM ENT W ITH 
PO SITIV ITY  CONSTRAINT
by
L e o n a r d  F. S. W a n g ( * )
Abstract
This paper investigates the global stability properties of a Walrasian 
price adjustment with a positivity constraint, using Olech-Ito theorem on 
planar dynamic system. It is shown that stronger sufficient conditions are 
needed for global stability in a Walrasian price adjustment model if the 
equilibrium point and initial point are in the positive orthant. For cases 
in which both goods are gross substitutes or both goods are gross com­
plements, the global stability of our model holds when, in addition to 
other sufficient conditions, the adjusted own-price effect is stronger than 
the net cross-price effect on excess demand (in absolute value). When the 
goods are of opposite types one a gross substitute and the other a gross 
complement -  the model is globally stable, for when the price of the good 
is falling, the rate of price change is smaller than the marginal change in 
price adjustment with respect to the price, again in terms of absolute value.
I. Introduction
There is considerable interest in economics in establishing the global 
stability of dynamic models. Olech [4 ]  proved a theorem for the global 
stability of a O  planar system, and since then it has been used to inves­
tigate global stability in dynamic economic models. (See e.g. Garcia [ 1 ],
(*) Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina 29631 U.S.A.
I wish to thank David Bowles, Rex Cottle, and the editor for their very significant 
comments and suggestions. Remaining errors are exclusively mine.
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Quirk [5 ] ,  Smith [6 ] ,  Takayama [8 ] and Wang [9]). Olech’s theorem, 
however, does not guarantee positivity of the variables along the solution 
path of the system, which is unsatisfactory from the viewpoint of eco­
nomics. Recently, Ito [2 ] has modified Olech’s theorem by assuming that 
both the equilibrium point and initial point are in the positive orthant ( ).
Smith [7 ] has examined the local stability properties of an economic 
system characterized by a Marshallian multimarket quantity adjustment 
rule, while Quirk [5 ]  analyzed the global stability of a Walrasian multi­
market price adjustment model by applying Olech’s theorem. In Quirk s 
study, however, the positivity of the price vector is not guaranteed along 
a solution path. The purpose of this paper is to use the modified Olech’s 
theorem to investigate global stability in a Walrasian model of interrelated 
markets with a positivity constraint. Section II  presents theorems for global 
asymptotic stability. Section III  deals with Walrasian price adjustment 
and stability. The results are summarized in Section IV.
II. Presentation of Olech’s Theorem and, Ito ’s Modification
Consider the following differential equation system in the real plane
^  : Xi =  fi (xi, xj), i — 1 , 2 , (1 )
where the f ’s are assumed to be of class O . Let (xi*,x2*) be a unique
equilibrium point when x; =  0, i =  1 ,2 . If we assume the existence of a 
unique equilibrium point, then the following theorem proved by Olech 
[4 ] holds.
Theorem 1. Suppose 
the above system (1):
(a) fu +fsa <  0
(b) /u /22 — /12/21 >  0
(c) either /u /a 0
or /12/21 5̂  0 (l)
satisfied for
for all (xi, x2) £ R2 
for all (xj, x2) £ R2 
for all (xi, x2) £ R2 
for all (xi, x2) £ R2
that the following conditions are
where fa =  d /./Sx ,, i , j  =  1, 2. Then the equilibrium point (x i*, xj* )  is 
unique and globally asymptotically stable.
(l) More recently, K ondor [3] considered a system of differential equations with non­
negativity conditions and proved that the system is asymptotically locally stable if a 
subsystem without the nonnegativity conditions is asymptotically locally stable, provided 
a simple (mathematical) condition prevails.
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Ito [ 2 ] observed that the transformation (v ,w) =  {exl, e12) leads to 
the following global stability result for the system
v =  h(v, tv) for all (xl; x2) e R2+ (2)
tv =  k (v, tv) for all (xi, x2) e R2+
assumed to be of class C1 in R*+ .
Theorem 2 . Suppose that there is an equilibrium point (v* , tv*) of 





( ,  h ' k \
( ,  h \
1 +  1
f
-  » )  
k \1 • 1 kw -n r )
<  0 for all (v, tv) e R2+
ii) either [h, ~  ~  ^  0 for a11 (V, tv) z R \
or hwkv ^  0 for all (v, tv) e R \
where hv =  (3/3t>) h (v, tv.) and hw, kv> and kw are similarly defined. Then 
the equilibrium point (v* ,  tv*) is unique (positive) and globally asymp­
totically stable.
This result follows immediately from Theorem 1 by observing that
h tv v k
hi hv ~ , /12 — “  hw, fji — kv, =  kw -----.v v IV w
The following corollary has a stronger but more useful condition for the 
global stability in the positive orthant.
Corollary. The result of Theorem 2 holds if (i)-(iii) are replaced 
by the following conditions.
(i) hv <  0, kw <  0 for all (v, tv) e R2+
(ii) ' hwkv <  0 for all (v , tv) e R2+
(iii)' Whenever h <  0 , 
and
hvv
>  1 ,
Jp f j )
Whenever k <  0 , —-—  >  1
for all (v, tv) e R2+ 
for ail (v , tv) e R2+ .
Note that (i)' and (ii)' are the sufficient conditions for global stability 
in the whole plane, and (iii)' keeps the solution path from hitting the
o l e c h ’ s  t h e o r e m  a n d  g l o b a l  s t a b i l i t y 341
axes(2). Proofs of the theorems are omitted here. For detailed proofs of 
the theorems, the interested reader is encouraged to read Olech [4 ] and
Ito [2 ] .
III . Walrasian Price Adjustment and Stability
We consider a model of a competitive economy in which there are 
only three commodities. Let Et(P), where P  =  (Pi, Pi, P3), denote the 
excess demand function of the ith commodity. Assume that an equilibrium- 
price vector exists, i.e., there is (Pi*, P2* ,  P3* )  such that
£.(P i*, P / ,  Ps*) =  0 , i =  1 , 2 , 3  
The tâtonnement adjustment process is described by
4 ^  _  p i =  gi [ E i (Pu  Pa)] , ¿ =  1 , 2
at





Note that by adding the homogeneity assumption of the excess de­
mand function, we normalize the price vector P such that P3 =  1 always.
Due to Walras’ Law, Ei =  0 and E2 =  0 imply E3=  0. Hence it suffices
to consider the adjustment process of the first two markets for stability 
analysis.
The stability properties of the linear approximation to system (3) 
may be examined by expanding the right-hand side of the system around 
the equilibrium price vector P * in a Taylor series, dropping all but the 
linear terms to obtain
Pi =  gi’ [E 11 (Pi -  Pi*)] +  [£12 (P2 -  P.*)] (4)
P2 =  g2 [£ 2, (Pi -  Pi*)] +  «*' [£22 (Pi -  P2*)] (5)
Where E (i =  3£i/3P ) evaluated at P *. As a matter of classifying goods, we 
say that good i is a gross substitute for good 7 if Efi >  0 ; good i is a gross 
complement for good 7 if Ea <  0 ; and good i is independent of 7 if Ea =  0 . 
Notice that these gross relationships are not necessarily symmetric even 
in qualitative terms. Thus good i may be a gross substitute for 7, while 
good ; is a gross complement for i .
(2) Wang [10], in an unpublished paper, « A  Note on the Global Stability of Dynamic 
Systems with Boundary Condition», Purdue University, 1979, presents a theorem of the 
global stability of system in R2+ with boundary conditions.
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We are now in a position to investigate the sufficient conditions for 
global stability of this system in the positive orthant. It is assumed that 
both the equilibrium point and the initial point are in the positive orthant, 
which would assert positivity of variables along the solution path by ap­
plying the modified Olech’s theorem. Furthermore, we assume the follow­
ing signs for partial derivatives:
Assumption 1 .
£u <  0 and E& <  0, for all (Pi, P2) z R2+ .
This assumption, which implies that an increase in own price leads to a 
decrease in excess demand, is almost always true.
Assumption 2 .
Either En >  0 and E^ >  0 for all (Pi, P2) £ R2+
or E12 <  0 and E2i <  0 for all (Pi, Pi) z R2+
This states that both goods are either gross substitutes or gross comple­
ments.
Assumption 2 ’.
Either Ea >  0 and E21 <  0 for all (Pi, P2) z R2+
or E2i <  0 and E21 >  0 for all (Pi, P2) e R2+
Assumption 2 ' says that both goods are not necessarily gross complements 
or gross substitutes — good i may be a gross substitute for good /, while 
good / is a gross complement for good i, or vice versa.
Quirk [5 ] has shown that by applying Theorem 1 the two-good 
system is globally stable under Assumption 1 and 2  as long as the own- 
price effect is larger than the cross-price effect on excess demand. Also, 
the two-good system is always globally stable under Assumption 1 and 2 '. 
The positivity of (Pi,P2) in this system, however, is not guaranteed 
along a solution path. In order to satisfy the economic requirement of 
positivity of (Pi, P2), we should apply Theorem 2  and its Corollary, in­
stead of Theorem 1 to the Walrasian price adjustment system. However, 
we need some additional assumptions in order to use Theorem 2 and the 
Corollary.
Assumption 3.
For one good i
p.
£« =  Eu — >  1 must hold, i =  1 , 2, for all (Pi,P2) £ R2+ ,
hi
where £« is the elasticity of the price adjustment of the zth good with 
respect to the price of the good. In words, Assumption 3 is satisfied when
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the rate of price change is smaller than the marginal change in price ad­
justment with respect to the price, in absolute value.
Assumption 4.
(S n -1 +  £'22_1) <  1 for all (Pi, Pi) £  R2+ 
and
E E2
EuE-a [1  — (£n 1 +  £22 1)] >  EaEn  _ _ for all (P i, P2) £ P  +
P i" i
For the case in which both goods are gross substitutes or both goods are 
gross complements, Assumption 4 requires that (i) the sum of the inverses 
of the elasticities of excess demand must not exceed one, and (ii) that 
the adjusted own-price effect is stronger than the net cross-price effect on 
excess demand, in absolute value.
Assumption 5.
If Pi <  0 , then £n >  1 holds for all (Pi,Pi) £ R2+ 
and
If P2 <  0 , then £22 >  1 holds for all (Pi,Pi) £ R +
According to Assumption 5, when the price of the good is falling, the rate 
of price change is smaller than the marginal change in price adjustment 
with respect to the price, in absolute value.
We use Theorem 2 and its Corollary by Ito [2 ] as well as the above 
assumptions to obtain the following results.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions of 1, 2 , 3, and 4, the equilibrium 
point (P i*, P i*) of the system (4) and (5) is globally stable in the positive 
orthant.
Proof. Ei
Pi(E” " x ) + (Ea
by Assumptions 1 and 3, and Walras’ law, i.e.,
Pi Ei +  P1E1 =  0 ;
<  0 ,
Ei_
Pi ) -
E jsE ii =  En En  [1
Ei E i
— EiiEn +  >  0 ,
P1P2
(£11 1 +  £22 1)]
by Assumptions 1, 2, 4, and Walras’ law.
Conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) of Theorem 2, therefore, are satisfied 
for the Walrasian system. Q.E.D.
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Theorem 4. If Assumptions 1 , 2 ', and 5 are satisfied, then the equi­
librium point {P i*, Pz*) of the system (4 )-{5 ) is globally stable in the 
positive orthant.
Proof.
Eu <  0, E& <  0, by Assumption 1;
EaEzi <  0, by Assumption 2';
If Pi <  0, then Eu >  1, by Assumption 5;
and
If Pz <  0, then £22 >  1, by Assumption 5.
In this case, the conditions of the corollary to Ito’s theorem 2  are 
satisfied for the Walrasian system. Q.E.D. IV.
IV. Summary
This paper has examined the sufficient conditions for global stability 
with a positivity constraint within the framework of a Walrasian price 
adjustment model. By applying a modified version of Olech’s Theorem, it 
is shown that stronger sufficient conditions are needed for global stability 
in a Walrasian price adjustment model if the equilibrium point and initial 
point are in the positive orthant. For cases in which both goods are gross 
substitutes or both goods are gross complements, the global stability of 
our model holds when, in addition to other sufficient conditions, the 
adjusted own-price effect is stronger than the net cross-price effect on 
excess demand (in absolute value). When the goods are of opposite types 
— one a gross substitute and the other a gross complement — the model 
is globally stable, for when the price of the good is falling, the rate of 
price change is smaller than the marginal change in price adjustment with 
respect to the price, again in terms of absolute value.
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IL  TEOREMA D I OLECH E  LA STABILITÀ GLOBALE D E LL ’AG­
GIUSTAMENTO W ALRASIANO D I PREZZO CON VINCOLI D I 
POSITIVITÀ
Questo saggio esamina il problema della stabilità globale di un sistema 
walrasiano di aggiustamento dei prezzi sotto vincoli di positività, mediante l’im­
piego del teorema di Olech-Ito sui sistemi dinamici. Si dimostra che le condi­
zioni sufficienti di stabilità globale in un modello walrasiano siffatto diventano 
più forti se tanto il punto di equilibrio che il punto iniziale giacciono nell’or- 
tante positivo. Nel caso di due beni che sono succedanei lordi oppure comple­
mentari lordi, il modello qui impiegato è globalmente stabile quando, in aggiunta 
ad altre condizioni sufficienti, l ’effetto diretto dell’aggiustamento di prezzo è 
più forte dell’effetto netto incrociato sull’eccesso di domanda (in valore asso­
luto). Se i beni sono di diverso tipo — l’uno succedaneo lordo, l’altro com­
plementare lordo — il modello è globalmente stabile, giacché, quando il prezzo 
del bene scende, il saggio di mutamento di prezzo è più piccolo del mutamento 
marginale dell’aggiustamento di prezzo rispetto al prezzo, anche qui in termini 
di valore assoluto.
BRAIN M IGRATIO N FROM  TH IRD  W ORLD: 
AN IM PLICA TIV E ANALYSIS
by
B. N. G hosh  ( *)
Abstract
The study purports to analyse the implications of brain migration 
from the points of view of LDCs. It critically examines the views expressed 
by nationalists and internationalists in this context. The implications of 
brain exchange and brain export are found to be beneficial types of brain 
migration, brain drain involves a loss of strategically important manpower, 
slowing down the tempo of development and creation of large external 
diseconomies. Brain overflow, for a thickly populated LDC, can act as a 
safety valve to release the surplus manpower, and thereby to minimise 
educated unemployment problem. Brain drain is a form of exploitation 
by the developed capitalist countries. The brain is wooed away without 
paying any compensation. Brain drain is, in fact, a form of reserve transfer 
of technology.
Introduction
The study on the implications and effects of brain migration is a 
nebulous area of research with many unsettled issues lurking around. A 
macro theory of international migration is concerned with the problems 
of effects of migration on the emigrating and the immigrating countries. 
Such a study is dominated by mainly two approaches — internationalist and 
nationalist, which may be briefly outlined here.
(*) Professor, Department of Economics, Panjab University, Chandigarh-160014 (India).
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Internationalists vs. Nationalists
To the internationalists, brain drain is a natural process benefitting 
the sending country, receiving country and the individual migrants. The 
developing countries benefit because they are able to shed out the useless 
manpower whose opportunity cost is zero and the stock of human capital 
of developing countries would be less without the opportunities provided 
by the «G rants Economy». The internationalists observe that intellectual 
resources are supernormal and cosmopolitan. If the free flow of such 
resources is not hampered, their spontaneous distribution throughout the 
world will lead to a maximisation of world production on the basis of 
optimum productivity through international division of labour. Interna­
tional mobility of factors of production including human capital will lead 
to factor price equalisation which will reduce inequalities of payment and 
maximise the welfare and income of the skilled personnel. According to 
them, it is but natural that capital should flow from surplus to deficit area 
and this can also ensure the optimum allocation of world resources.
A number of advantages are claimed for brain drain from the low 
developed countries by the so-called cosmopolitan writers. It is said that 
brain drain involves non-zero sum game benefitting both the emigrating 
and the immigrating countries. The outflow of HQM reduces unemploy­
ment, raises the domestic capital-labour ratio, increases productivity, in­
come and output and also maximises the welfare of the non-migrants (*).
It is also argued that skilled people who go abroad ultimately return 
with better qualification and training. They lend consultancy services to 
the domestic economy, occasionally visit the native countries and render 
help co the resident country by publishing their research results and by 
making their improved knowledge available to them. For instance, Chinese 
nuclear capability was built up by the Chinese scientists after they 
returned from American universities [4 ] . Brain drain has brought reputation 
and prestige to the sending countries and has also opened up opportunities 
for foreign training and education [2 3 ].
Grubel and Scott find that brain drain, in general, increases welfare 
and income [1 0 ]. According to them, if the sending country wants to 
maximise income, emigration is helpful. In terms of the global welfare 
function, the loss on account of brain drain appears to be minimal, and in 
fact, disappears in the long run. Economic power, they observe, does not 
depend so much on output but on per capita income which may or may
(i) Among others, Harry Johnson, Grubel and Scott, Kanappan, Myint, Usher and 
Mishan hold such a view.
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not be affected by emigration. In comparison to the possible short term 
loss due to brain drain, the benefits from emigration are indeed great in 
terms of remittances and the spread effect of the advanced research and 
technology made possible by the HQM.
Dan Usher found that the emigrants abandon their shares of public 
property in the country of origin and acquire a share of the same in the 
immigrating country. In fact, the immigrants receive more from their 
share in public expenditure than they give up by way of the taxes [2 8 ]. 
When the property is left in the native country, the non-migrants are 
benefitted.
Myint was explaining migration as a phenomenon which can correct 
disequilibrium in the demand for and the supply of HQM in LDC [1 8 ]. 
Brain drain not only reduces the gap between the demand for and supply 
of manpower but it is also capable of narrowing down the technological 
gap existing between the DCs and LDCs.
Be that as it may, the so-called internationalist view point has been 
vehemently criticised by the writers of the nationalist camp. International 
movement of factors of production is different from the movement of 
human capital. Brain drain does not involve free movement of individuals 
and it is also not based on the exchange economy because there is only 
the outflow of skilled people from the LDCs but not the corresponding 
inflow. The people who leave the developing countries are not all useless; 
on the other hand, they are crucial for the development of the capital-poor 
countries. Skill can, to a great extent, be substituted for capital in backward 
countries.
Migration, however, is not necessarily bad, if it is a two-way traffic. 
What is bad in brain drain is that it leads to a one-way migration of 
skilled manpower from the countries which have shortage of them and 
which require them very badly, to the countries which are saturated with 
specialists. In fact, the supply of very high quality manpower is indeed 
low in LDCs. Similarly, a universal and cosmopolitan economy is a con­
ceptual abstraction. Amidst the growing inequalities between the poor 
and the rich countries, national development should be the first considera­
tion for the poor countries. So long as the nation states exist, the concept 
of world economy or government cannot become a valid operational 
concept. For individual countries, per capita output is more important than 
the world output. Thus the question of maximization of world output is 
beside the point.
Throughout the world, income and price differentials exist even for 
unskilled manpower which does not play any role in brain drain. Dandekar
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has refuted the trade theory explanation of brain drain by saying that 
income differential cannot explain the behaviour of non-migrants in whose 
case the differential is as important or as high as in the case of migrants [ 7 ]. 
If the « factor-price equalisation theorem » is correct, the skilled personnel 
from the Third World will go on moving into the advanced countries 
until the price of their services becomes equal throughout the world. But 
nothing of this sort has happened or is happening. The nationalists 
observe that since brain drain leads to more and more inequality, it 
cannot be thought to be a normal process. They maintain that through 
brain drain the rich countries are becoming richer and the poor poorer. 
If it is regarded as a normal process, why is the immigration of unskilled 
labour restricted by DCs?
It is also argued that the emigrating persons are not always benefitted 
by brain drain. The contingents do not always get jobs according to their 
choice, and works sometimes do not correspond to their education. Thus 
a physicist may have to work as a taxi cab driver and a teacher as a 
cleaner. The job conditions are sometimes very unpleasant and the con­
tingents face racial and other discriminations, uncertainty, lack of adjust­
ments, loss of skill, and even unemployment due to changes in labour 
market situation. To an advanced country, brain is like an ordinary com­
modity having no special prestige and value. While for the LDCs, brain 
drain leads to loss, wastage of resources, skill bottlenecks and lesser rate 
of growth; for the DCs, it is helpful to ease the shortage of necessary 
skill and to overcome the bottlenecks and disproportion in the labour 
market. The nationalists maintain that brain drain is very harmful for 
the sending country but is very helpful for the receiving country. This 
point has been countered by the internationalists.
Dan Usher has challenged the view that DCs gain by immigration 
from LDCs. The public expenditure in DCs goes up considerably as a 
result of immigration, and this results in net loss for DCs. Mishan and 
Needleman demonstrated that as a result of brain migration per capita 
income in U.K. has declined [1 5 ]. They have also argued that if net 
immigration occurs in conditions of high employment, prices in the host 
country rise relatively to prices abroad. In the absence of government 
control, the host country’s propensity to import increases and balance of 
payment situation is adversely affected [1 6 ]. Immigration also generates 
various types of shortages in a market economy, e.g., housing shortage, 
transport bottleneck, lesser amenities of life and so on. J . T. Romans found 
that immigration is a burden because the cost of public services as an 
aftermath of immigration far outweighs the gains from the immigrants [ 2 2  ].
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The internationalists also criticised the arguments put forward by the 
nationalists. Thus the criticism and counter criticism by one group against 
the other are sustained with much zeal and the controversy is still now 
kept alive.
Brain Migration: Effects and Implications
Unfortunately, the whole debate between the nationalists and the 
internationalists on the issue of the outflow of HQM from LDCs is 
based on a serious misconception of facts. Neither of the groups could 
appreciate the taxonomy of brain migration. They could not distinguish 
between the two major components of brain migration, viz., brain drain 
and brain overflow. Needless to say, their analyses were a hopeless mess 
of the conceptual ambiguities, which is the main cause of their differences. 
Unless we know the specific category of brain migration, we cannot pre­
cisely know its implications. In other words, depending on the type of 
brain migration, a country may have different effects. It is, therefore, 
necessary to use our classificatory scheme to gauge the effects of brain 
migration. Our analysis will show that while brain overflow is good for 
a less developed country, ridden with the problem of educated unemploy­
ment, brain drain is bad for a developing economy.
Brain exchange and brain export will not apparently have any marked 
repercussion on the LDCs because these are essentially based on quid pro 
quo. At times they will, of course, be very beneficial for both the partners, 
as each will receive what is better for its economy. By exchange and 
export of manpower, LDCs can improve their economic position. But the 
share of exchange and export in total brain outflow is still insignificant 
for most of the LDCs in the world. Although the export of human capital 
is sluggish in the world economy, it has promising prospects in some 
LDCs and DCs. Through export of brain, a regular source of income can 
be ensured to the exporting countries. It can also improve the foreign 
exchange position of a growing economy and thereby improve the balance 
of payment position. But the LDCs do not have any happy experience 
regarding the exchange of brains. The foreign technicians and experts who 
are frequently brought in LDCs have to be paid a very high salary and 
maintained at a very high cost without corresponding benefits. A good 
case can, however, be made for the exchange of HQM among the LDCs 
themselves.
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Brain Overflow
Brain overflow, on the whole, is a beneficial process for a number 
of reasons. For thickly populated underdeveloped countries, brain outflow 
acts as a safety valve to release the surplus manpower. It can also consi­
derably reduce the problem of educated unemployment and thereby can 
ease social tension, unrest among the young people, frustration and wastage 
of human resources. Since overflow involves unemployed manpower, its 
emigration implies the realisation of a huge amount of saving potential. 
Such manpower had been consuming from the social stock of production, 
making no saving (rather dissaving), paying no tax, and earning no 
income. The marginal productivity of such manpower in the domestic 
economy was zero or even negative. Thus, through their outflow, saving 
and investment can both improve, which can be utilised for the domestic 
capital formation. The outflow of this redundant manpower will mean 
extra saving which is at least equivalent to its consumption of food and 
clothing and maintenance cost. It is, therefore, sometimes felt that brain 
overflow from a LDC is not a loss (2).
In the case of unemployment brains, the marginal cost of providing 
public services remains very high because it is not compensated in any way 
by the corresponding tax from the unemployed people. The country, 
therefore, remains a net loser. Thus, in a sense, for public exchequer, the 
benefit from brain overflow is obviously higher than the involved cost in 
the context of zero tax revenue. Brain overflow does not lead to any 
diminution of output, for, by definition, the marginal productivity of 
surplus labour is at least zero. In such a situation, income gained in the 
form of additional saving realised as a result of syphoning off the surplus 
‘labour is an absolute advantage of brain overflow. It has to be specified 
that unemployed brains do not possess any capital to work with in home 
countries and the capital embodied in them in the form of education is 
raw and inexperienced, and being unemployed,' they do not possess 
any capital. Therefore, the outflow of such brains does not involve 
any capital loss particularly in view of the fact that this manpower 
cannot be productively utilised in the home country. It cannot 
be denied that the immediate income gain both private and public is 
substantially larger than the capital loss if any,* in the form of outflow of
(2) Morarji Desai in the capacity of Finance Minister of India told in Calcutta on 
15th December, 1968 that brain migration is not a loss to India.
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unused educated manpower. The beneficial impact of brain overflow can 
be explained by the following diagram (Fig. 1) on the assumption of a 






In Fig. 1 quadrant A shows the inverse relationship between brain 
overflow (vertical axis) and unemployment of HQM  (horizontal axis) 
such that at B2 amount of brain overflow, the corresponding educated 
unemployment is Us and at J3i amount of brain overflow, educated unem­
ployment is Ui. The B quadrant of the diagram shows the inverse 
relationship between demographic investment (cost) and brain overflow. 
It is clear from the diagram that when the brain overflow is high from 
a country both educated unemployment and demographic investment 
become low. Conversely, when brain overflow goes down, both unem­
ployment and demographic investment go up. This shows that brain 
overflow can be very influential in socioeconomic spheres, and its effect 
is generally wholesome on the economic and social development of an 
under-developed country.
The gains from brain overflow becomes still larger once we take into 
account the remittances sent by the overflow HQM  from abroad. There is 
an increasing amount of evidence that the remittances are not only very 
important but very large. However, this is an issue which is very much 
neglected in the literature. For a very low income country like Bangladesh, 
the remittances that have been received are between $200 and $250
BRAIN MIGRATION FRO M  TH IRD WORLD 353
million and for India the recent figure is $2.5 billion (3). Professor Schultz 
observes that when this figure for one year is put against the expenditures 
for education in India, it indeed goes a long way to compensate for 
the cost of a great deal of the education in India. The remittances of 
Indians employed abroad to India increased from Rs. 14.4 crores in 1960 
to Rs. 135 crores in 1970. In contrast to the negligible remittances by 
Indians employed abroad prior to 1973, remittances from abroad increased 
at a rapid rate since 1973. Inward remittances to India from non 
residents increased from Rs. 191 crores in 1973 to Rs. 239.8 crores in 
1974, Rs. 477.8 crores in 1975, Rs. 633.1 crores in 1976 and Rs. 820.0 
crores in 1977 [1 4 ] . India receives Rs. 500 crores in foreign exchange 
a year from the Gulf Indians alone [1 3 ]. These remittances form a large 
part of total export earnings.
Among the selected countries from which export of labour takes 
place to the Gulf countries, foreign exchange earning from emigrants 
was largest in the case of Pakistan with $1,110 million in 1977 followed 
by Egypt $1,025 million; India received $1,000 million (Table 1). It can 
be observed from the Table that among countries that received the major
Table 1.
REMITTANCES REPATRIATED BY EMIGRANTS
(Million Dollars) __________
Country 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Afghanistan ____ ____ — — 200
Bangladesh — 18 43 53 75
Egypt 87 189 340 615 1025
India 235 297 535 713 1000
Jordan 45 75 167 411 425
Korea 154 154 158 195 172
Pakistan 151 230 353 590 1110
Philippines — 104 128' 112 130
Sri Lanka — — 3 7 12
Sudan — — — 12 40
Yemen Arab Republic 129 156 307 796 1000
Yemen People’s Democratic 
Republic 33 41 56 115 179
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1979.
(3 ) p rof. T. W. Schultz of Chicago University in a private communication to Dr. B. N. 
Ghosh of Panjab University, on October 25, 1979 has mentioned these figures on remittances.
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share of remittances, India’s position was at the top during the period 
1973-1975. The earnings from the export of surplus labour have helped 
in augmenting India’s foreign exchange reserve. In a sense, foreign 
exchange bottleneck of India since the second five year plan has been 
eased with the large inflow of remittance from abroad. The remittances 
to India and their shares in total reserves, import and export is shown 
in Table 2.
Table 2.
INWARD REMITTANCES TO INDIA (Rs. in crores)
A s at the end 
o f the year Rem ittances
Level o f reserves 
(excluding go ld  
and S D R s)
Im ports E xports
1973 191.0 376.8 2413 2261
(50.7) (7.9) (8.5)
1974 239.8 587.4 4087 3179
(40.8) (5.9) (7.5)
1975 477.8 754.3 5338 3643
(63.3) (9.0) (13.1)
1976 633.1 2298.5 5074 4969
(27.5) (12.5) (12.7)
1977 820.0 3998.3 5793 5554
(20.5) (14.2) (14.8)
Note: Figures in the parentheses indicate percentages. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 1979.
As this Table shows, in 1973, remittances accounted for as much 
as 50.7 percent of India’s foreign exchange reserves; but it came down 
to 20.5 per cent in 1977 as the total reserves rose rapidly. The remittances 
represented 8.5 per cent of the value of India’s total export in 1973, but 
it rose to 14.8 percent in 1977. In the case of imports, the remittances 
formed 7.9 per cent and 14.2 per cent respectively for the same period.
Remittances in other countries are also similarly increasing. South 
Korean doctors during 1964-68 sent home more than $14 million; 
Turkey received a remittance of $70 million in 1965 from its people living 
in U.S.A.; Lebanon received yearly 400-600 million Lebanese pounds 
from her citizens living abroad [3 2 ], However, in the absence of a separate 
study on remittances for category-wise brain migration, it is very difficult 
to appreciate the nature, magnitude and impact of remittances. Whatever 
information we could gather on remittances from our very limited 
survey in Calcutta, Chandigarh and Delhi is very revealing indeed. 
It is found that most of the unemployed educated brains of India migrate 
mainly to the Gulf countries and Africa, whereas the employed brains
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prefer to go to U.S.A., U.K., Canada and so on. The remittances sent by 
the overflown brain are comparatively large. The brains that overflow 
abroad keep their families in the country of origin and send almost their 
entire income back for their families which could make a substantial saving 
out of the remittances. The overflow is mainly from the low-income 
families as revealed in our survey. This implies that after meeting the 
limited budget in accordance with the modest standard of living, a large 
part of the money can be invested in trade and industries.
Thus, brain overflow, as the Indian condition depicts, is welfare­
raising and development-inducing type of brain migration. It does not 
affect the average level of education in the country either at present or in 
the future; but on the other hand, brain overflow covers almost wholly the 
private and the public cost of human capital involved. It is not harmful 
in the short run; nor does it create any dislocations and require any 
organisational change.
Brain Drain
Brain drain is a fish of an entirely different kettle. It involves the 
loss of strategic manpower and that too from the key positions in a 
country. As such, it will create many dislocations and require a drastic 
organisational change. The losses involved in brain drain as calculated by 
Comay, Bowman, Myers, Sjaastad, Weisbrod and others through the present 
value approach, are found to be very high indeed. The losses involved in 
brain drain are of many types, e.g., loss of present production, loss of 
future production, loss of present saving, loss of future saving emigrants 
would have made, loss of taxes and loss of potential innovations and so 
forth. Firstly, the LDCs would experience the loss of valuable skilled 
personnel. Skill formation in these countries is palpably sluggish although 
the requirement is really very high. In fact, the highly skilled manpower 
is rare in any country. India is desparately in need of both physical and 
human capital, and cannot certainly afford to lose the strategic manpower. 
Secondly, brain drain involves the loss of money invested in the education, 
training and skill formation!4). At present there are 250,000 professionally 
skilled Indians in U.S.A. Presuming the average education and training 
cost of a specialist to be $20,000 the loss sustained by India so far as a 
result of brain drain to America alone comes to $5 billion.
(4) For the extent of monetary loss, see, B. N. G hosh, « Some Economic Aspects of 
India Brain Drain into United States», International Migration, Nos. 3&4, 1979.
356 B. N. GHOSH
Highly qualified strategic persons are essential for capital and skill 
formation, education, research and training, infrastructure-building and 
economic and social development. Thus, by brain drain, the LDCs become 
loser and poorer, and development is halted. Brain drain leads to more 
and more inequality in the distribution of skilled manpower in the world. 
International inequality accentuates because of the fact that whereas brain 
drain reduces the income and production of the emigrating country, it 
makes the economic position for DCs better off. Myrdal argues that the 
movement of skilled personnel is harmful to the sending countries, 
because such economies suffer from « Backwash Effect » as a result of 
brain drain. The LDCs become more and more backward due to brain drain.
A report prepared by ARE for UNESCO points out that brain drain 
is an immoral process hampering progress in the developing economies 
and depriving them of the badly needed skilled personnel. Brain drain is 
morally obtuse in at least two senses: (1) the strategic manpower of LDCs 
is wooed away (ii) no compensation is made to the brain among countries 
by the brain receiving countries. Brain drain damages the morale of 
those who cannot emigrate. The demoralising consequences erode the 
socio-psychological situation and lead to national frustration. The leadership 
and the creative contribution of science, technology and development, 
which the emigrating people would have made, are lost by the sending 
country as a result of brain drain. The indirect costs of brain drain are 
many. Some of these are: slow-down in production, weakening of admi­
nistrative and executive structures, rebuilding of skill, apathy of the state 
to skill formation and so on. By brain drain the intellectual climate of the 
country is very much adversely affected. Without the. intelligentsia, the 
idea of progress cannot be spread effectively. Thus, brain drain hampers 
social development, modernisation and economic growth.
Thomas Romans observes that migration of HQM reduces the average 
educational lével of the country [2 2 ], The emigration of HQM widens 
the technological gap and increases the technological dependence of the 
domestic country. During 1951-62, India entered into 2,200 agreements 
for the import of technology of which 30 per cent were from U.K. and 
20 per cent from U.S.A. and the rest was from other developed countries. 
When the process continues, people only train themselves at home with 
the sole aim of ultimately emigrating abroad, and in the process, the 
national moral value, culture and tradition are neglected. A decline in 
the moral values results in selfishness, careerism and even corruption. 
All these adversely affect patriotism, national solidarity and creative 
activity. The loss of critical manpower which can influence the Govern­
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ment policies is a serious loss, particularly for the politically and the 
economically weak developing economies. As a matter of fact, external 
diseconomies involved in brain drain are indeed very large [1 9 ].
The more skilled the emigrant, the more is the possibility of unem­
ployment in the sending country, at least temporarily. The emigration of 
managerial class will automatically reduce domestic employment [2 2 ]. If 
an engineer, under whom 15 persons are working, leaves the country, the 
15 people become unemployed until his position can be filled. There is a 
high complementarity of HQM to other productive resources. The flight 
of HQM from the domestic economy leads to a reduction in productivity. 
The loss from brain drain is enormous in the short period. In the long 
run, the loss of HQM is partly replaced in a growing economy. Brain drain 
may involve zero-sum game and the propagation of research result may 
be constrained by patent or by CIA secrecy requirement. Thus, the brain­
sending country cannot take any advantage of the superior knowledge 
of its brain living abroad.
Grubel and Scott’s study comes out with the observation that inter­
national migration of human capital reduces military and economic power 
by a very small amount in the short time horizon, and in the longrun the 
loss disappears [1 0 ]. Only under rare circumstances, brain drain could 
reduce welfare. However, the short run loss is more than outweighed by 
the benefits of emigration. Grubel and Scott’s findings have been challenged 
by Berry and Soligo [3 ] , among others. They demonstrated that emigration 
causes loss to nations. Similar conclusion is upheld by Weisbrod [3 1 ], and 
Bhagwati and Hamada [5 ] . Depending upon the structure and the institu­
tional set up of a country, brain drain can be said to have varying welfare 
effects, as observed by Bhagwati and Hamada. Brain drain of highly gifted 
manpower results in welfare loss for the sending-country. Anteny Ward 
regards brain drain as a manifestation of exploitation of less developed 
countries by developed capitalistic countries [3 0 ]. He observes that over 
the generations, the majority of emigrants are reduced to an exploited 
and marginal group in the society. In an empirical study conducted in 1972, 
UNCTAD calculated income gains to the receiving-countries and income 
losses by the sending countries as a result of brain drain [2 6 ] . Aitkin’s 
study demonstrated that brain drain not only reduced welfare but it also 
redistributed income from unskilled labour to the remaining skilled 
labour [1 ] . What is good for the U.S., is not necessarily good for the 
whole world, remarks Brinley Thomas.
Harry Johnson’s analysis was not able to show welfare gain as a 
result of brain drain, though, he, as an internationalist, intended to rigo­
rously demonstrate it [1 2 ]. Let use explain his following diagram (Fig. 2).
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In Fig. 2, DD is the demand curve of the population for specialised 
services, No, is the initial supply of professionals and Po is the price for 
their services. If N0N1 people leave the country, the loss of consumers 
surplus is QP0P 1R, but the non-migrants’ income increases to the extent 
of PoPiRS. This leads to a net loss of QRS. According to Johnson, this 
marginal loss will vanish when the supply of professionals increases as a 
result of their increased price. This conclusion of Johnson is not at all 
tenable, at least on two counts. Firstly, increased supply of professionals 
is not simply a function of enhanced price. Granted it is so, increased 
supply of HQM will once again decrease the price, and therefore, the 
subsequent supply. Secondly, the increased supply of HQM, given the 
domestic absorptive capacity, will lead to more brain drain which will 
sustain the net loss of consumers surplus. Thus, Johnson’s diagram could 
not effectively prove the positive welfare implication of brain drain process.
The welfare implication of brain drain can be related to capital that 
migrants take along or leave behind. If capital is left behind, capital-labour 
ratio will increase and income gain would be substantially high for the 
non-migrants; but if capital is taken along, capital loss will more than 
outweigh the income gain, and as a result, society will experience welfare 
loss [1 0 ,1 1 ,1 3 ].
Brain drain involves loss of capital in two senses: (i) loss of gifted, 
experienced and very highly qualified and skilled human capital and (ii) 
loss of physical capital accompanying the permanent emigrants, and also 
the loss of their working capital. It is to be recalled that brain overflow 
representing unemployed brains presumably cannot create any capital or
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do not have any working capital. If we take the above explanations to be 
correct, brain drain will make the capital-labour ratio lower in the 
domestic economy in which case capital loss would more than offset the 
income gain. This is explained by the following diagram (Fig. 3).
The emigration of NoNi amount of employed skilled workers leads to 
a rise in wages, from W0 to Wi. The total income gained by the non-migrants 
is the area W0FEW 1 which is smaller than the area W0GEW 1 which is 
lost by the society as a result of the reduction in capital-labour ratio 
brought about by the flight of capital through brain drain. Therefore, the 
net loss sustained by the non-migrants is the triangle EFG. This loss occurs 
for two reasons: (I) decrease in capital-labour ratio as a result of brain 
drain and (II) relative increase in the supply of other factors leading to 
a fall in marginal productivity and in price. It is now clear that brain drain 
reduces a country’s total stock of social capital. Therefore, productivity 
after sometime will come down and along with that the wage level, making 
thereby the position reversed and worse off. Our analysis is based on the 
presumption that the value of emigrant’s capital both physical and human 
is higher than the country’s average per capita endowment of human and 
physical capital. If this presumption is correct, as seems to be plausible, 
the welfare loss as a result of brain drain indeed becomes very high. 
However, the net loss in the domestic economy, triangle EFG, is more than 
offset by the increase in the migrant’s income of EFGH. While the 
domestic economy loses as a result of emigration of skilled personnel, the 
emigrants themselves gain.
In the case of brain overflow, there being no question of output loss, 
the realisation of saving potential will directly lead to net income gain. 
But, for brain drain, capital loss and hence output and production loss
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will more than swamp out the income gain. No doubt, the migrants earn 
more income but there is no satisfactory system to compensate the losses 
to those left behind. The society does not compensate the losers. Thus, 
migration of HQM from LDCs is not a Pareto optimal situation. True, 
remittances are repatriated in the cases of brain drain and brain overflow; 
but the remittances are not adequate, regular and compulsory, specially in 
the case of brain drain. As our survey reveals, the brain drain is directed 
mostly to developed countries where the skilled personnel take their 
families along with them. They do not send substantial amount to their 
relatives in India, and it is also not possible for them to send a large sum 
of money after meeting the expenditure for their families and making the 
necessary savings for the rainy days. It has been observed that a large 
part of the migrants’ income is spent on the education and training of 
their wards. Brain drain from India is mainly from the upper middle 
class and rich families. This implies that not only the average cost of 
living of the migrants is high but that they have had a propensity to 
spend on conspicuous consumption which not merely reduces the amount 
of remittances but also reduces the effective saving of their relatives in 
India out of the remitted amount.
In this context, the findings of two other studies made in India may 
be corroborative [1 4 ]. Remittances are a special type of transfer payment 
in the sense that these are essentially a transfer of personal income used 
partly for consumption and partly for investment. Very little empirical 
work has gone into the question of channelisation of the resources arising 
out of remittances to productive investment. However, two studies under­
taken by Bombay Chamber of Commerce and Industries in respect of the 
impact of inward remittances received in certain villages of Kerala and 
Gujarat have made some interesting observations about the pattern of 
use of the remitted money.
These studies show that a good bit of the remittances are channelled 
in the form of high expenditure on consumption goods, purchase of durable 
goods and property, or investment in securities, trade and business including 
speculation. The study on the impact of remittances received in certain 
villages of Kerala does not seem to have triggered off an era of sustained 
growth in the state. The study particularly pin-points the fact that much 
of the money flowing into the state from abroad has not been used for 
productive purposes. Investment in debentures, shares and securities has 
been almost nil. These observations, thus, indicate that the savings of the 
Indians employed abroad were not channelised for development purposes 
according to the national priorities. It can, therefore, be stated that brain
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drain cannot lead to an adequate compensatory payment to the losers, and 
it cannot cover the public and private cost of human capital involved in 
brain drain, albeit it partly meets the private cost.
Brain drain deprives the emigrating country of the saving and invest­
ment which the migrants would have made, had they not emigrated abroad. 
Presumably, the amount of this relinquished saving and investment is 
pretty high because these skilled personnel are well within the high income 
margin. In most of these cases, surplus was being generated in the economy 
as the wage level fell far short of the level of the marginal productivity 
of such type of labour. The economy is deprived of this surplus at present 
and in future, as brain drain occurs. The state exchequer sustains a loss 
in one more respect. Through brain drain, the government loses a flabby 
amount of tax money per year which would have been contributed to 
exchequer by the brains who are generally high income persons, in whose 
case tax is much higher than the marginal cost of public goods they 
consume. Thus, the government is deprived permanently of an important 
source of net revenue. All these unmistakably substantiate the fact that 
brain drain is not merely a welfare-cum-income reducing phenomenon, 
but it also considerably hampers the growth process of a low developed 
country on many counts, one of which is the conspicuous trend of Reverse 
Transfer of Technology from the LDCs to DCs. Let us discuss this aspect 
in a bit more elaborate manner.
Brain Drain and Neo-Colonialism: Reverse Transfer of Technology
The problem of brain drain is generated and intensified by the 
deliberate neo-imperialistic policy of developed capitalist countries. The 
exploitation by them continues unabated but in a different fashion in the 
sense that while in the pre-industrial revolution, the capitalist countries drew 
resources from the colonies in the form of physical capital, in the post­
industrial revolution period, they are drawing away the human capital 
resources from the LDCs. Thus, Richard Titmus calculated that the U.S. 
saved about 4 million dollars due to the immigration of approximately 
100,000 professionals in the period 1949-67. The losses involved are not 
merely the financial outlay but the real loss is the permanent one of subse­
quent reduction in productivity, slower growth of intellectual leadership 
and retarded innovative spirit in the affected country (5). The brain that
(5) The losses can be interpreted in terms of the loss of educational investment, the 
cost of relinquished alternatives, the loss of life-time income, the loss of interest on invested 
capital and also the social loss.
362 B. N. GHOSH
is wooed away by the developed countries is never paid its public or social 
cost, and as such, the brain sending countries always remain losers and 
brain receiving countries always gainers.
The most important item in the international intercourse today is 
not food, fuel and fibre but transaction in technology. The developed 
countries consider themselves as the vectors of technological salvation 
in the modern world. The U.S.A. every year exports technology to the 
extent of Rs. 36 thousand crores but it imports only Rs. 4 thousand crores 
worth of technology. To correct her structural imbalance created by the 
rapid spurt in the demand for HQM as against its almost static supply, 
the U.S.A. has to import HQM, the seed-corn technology, from the LDCs. 
This transaction in HQM is made in such an evasive way that ultimately 
no price for the use of HQM is required to be paid to the country that 
supplies the HQM. It is estimated that by 1985, the rest of the world will 
pay the U.S.A. $23 billions as dividends, fees and royalties for the transfer of 
technology. In fact, American technology is produced largely by the HQM 
of the Thirld World. Immigration to America is equal to the annual output 
of about 5 per cent of the institutions of higher studies in U.S.A. [1 1 ]. 
Similarly, about 50 percent of the British National Health Services is now 
staffed by non-Britons, and the influx of doctors representing an annual 
savings of over Rs. 40 crores to the British exchequer [2 1 ].
The present technological supremacy of the U.S. would be difficult 
to maintain, if the supply of HQM to America is stopped or reduced. 
Instead of importing raw materials, DCs are now importing brains from 
LDCs without giving any compensation. This shows that in the inter­
national economic relations, the colonial-metropolitan nexus is still now 
prevailing. The HQM is obtained as raw materials, turned into finished 
products and sold out to colonies at an exorbitant direct or indirect price. 
Between 1964 and 1970, India paid Rs. 285 million in royalty payments 
and Rs. 285 million in technical fees. In addition, she paid Rs. 173 
million to foreign technicians. Thus, in a period of six years, India paid 
a total foreign exchange of Rs. 742 million for American technology [6 ] . 
Modern LDCs provide both raw materials (HQM) and the market for 
the goods produced by the capitalist countries. This sort of technological 
imperialism leads to international «Backwash E ffect» making the poor 
areas poorer and the rich areas richer.
The idea is often propagated that the capitalist countries have been 
helping the LDCs by giving them aid and assistance. This apparently 
innocuous statement has to be taken with a caveat. Let us give it a close 
look. According to the UNCTAD report, in 1970, U.S.A.’s aid to LDCs
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amounted to $3.1 billion. India received from the U.S.A. during 1950-51 - 
1975-76, R s.5410 crores of aid which roughly comes to R s.360 crores 
per year on an average [9 ] . As against this, the income gained by U.S.A. 
through brain drain from LDCs amounts to $3.7 billion [2 7 ], This shows 
that whatever aid is given by the U.S.A. to the LDCs is more than com­
pensated by the brain gain. The highest contribution to the net income 
gained by the U.S.A. is made by the developing countries of Asia par­
ticularly. India’s contribution in this respect was $874 million in 1970. 
Each of the following countries received a milliard dollar worth of aid 
after War II, e.g., India, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, 
South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey. But these are also the countries which 
provided about two-thirds of those professionals who settled down in 
U.S.A. The U.S. sends as many experts to the developing countries as she 
receives from them via brain drain [2 9 ]. But the telling tale of exploitation 
is adequately revealed by the fact that while the U.S.A. does not pay a 
single buck for the brain obtained from LDCs, she is highly paid for the 
services of her exports who happened to be mostly the HQM from the poor 
countries. Thus, the leader cunningly rides on the laggards and wins 
the rat race of capitalistic game.
The U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus R. Vance, while making a 
statement on foreign assistance programme before the Congressional Sub- 
Committee on 29.3.1979 stated that U.S. aid to LDCs is beneficial to 
U .S .(6). He made the following observations in support of his statement:
(1 ) In 1977, developing countries bought $42 billion of U.S. merchan­
d ise-m o re  than one-third of all U.S. export.
(2 ) During the 1970s, sales of goods to LDCs grew 50 per cent faster 
than U.S. sales to industrialised countries.
(3 ) Over the past five years, LDCs have provided more than 25 per 
cent of the raw-materials the U.S.A. uses.
For expanding market for their products, U.S. has increased foreign 
aid from $3.7 billion in 1965 to $7 billion in 1979. Money given to LDCs 
as aid ultimately comes back to U.S. as import demand of LDCs. Apart 
from royalties and licensing fees, remitted earning from LDCs on U.S. 
direct foreign investment comes to $4 billion [1 7 ]. An estimated 2
(6) Statement by U.S. Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D.C., p. 17. 
President Kennedy made a similar statement at the time of establishment of AID. McNamara 
also observed that foreign aid was in the interest of the donor countries because the large 
donated amount ultimately came back to them. See, Robert S. McNamara, One Hundred 
Countries, Two Billion People, The Dimensions of Development, Praeger Publishers, New 
York, 1973, p. 20.
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million American jobs depend on exports to developing countries. For 
every dollar that the U.S. contributes to international financial institutions 
that give aid, the recipients spend dollar 2 to buy goods and services from 
the U.S.A. [2 4 ]. Huge amount of profit is earned from the LDCs by the 
agents of foreign capitalists. In India, foreign subsidiaries earned total 
profit of R s.412 million in 1964-65, which went up to R s.755 million 
in 1969-70 [6 ] . The so-called foreign aid is nothing but an economic 
tool to prop up the sagging industries of the donor countries and to make 
the donees dependent on the former. The aid is mostly tied and the debt 
servicing requirement is abnormally high. « The biggest single misconcep­
tion about the foreign aid programme is that we send money abroad. We 
don’t. Foreign aid consists of American equipment, raw materials, expert 
services and food. 93 per cent of the aid funds are spent directly in the 
U.S.A. to pay for these things » ( 7). A British Government pamphlet on 
Foreign Aid said that « about two-thirds of all our aid is actually spent 
in Britain ». A former World Bank President, George Woods, has observed 
that some countries have made it clear that they consider development 
finance as nothing more than a disguised subsidy for their exports. It is clear 
that the conditions of aid are directly intended to serve the interest of 
the countries providing it.
On the other hand, the loss sustained by the developing countries 
on account of brain drain is enormous. 38,000 HQM which migrated to the 
U.S. between 1962-66 represented a loss of $7.6 milliard. Between 
1949-61, about 3922 skilled personnel left India for U.S., and this repre­
sents a value of $1055 million [2 ] . In 1970, India lost nearly 875 
million dollars for the brain drain of 3,141 HQM to U.S.A. The U.S. 
on the other hand gains substantially from the brain drain from LDCs. 
The income gained by U.S.A. and lost by India per unit of immigration 
in 1970 is given in Table 3.
In the above income gain of USA, Asia contributed $2,901 million, 
Africa $374 million and Latin America $387 million. The developing 
countries’ contribution to U.S. becomes nearly $45 million every year. 
The technologically backward countries pass on a substantial part of their 
technological assets (brains) each year to advanced countries which are 
apparently technologically superior. However, LDCs’ assistance to U.S.A. 
becomes more overwhelming than American aid to these countries. It is 
in this sense, that the concept of reverse transfer of technology from 
LDCs to DCs can be looked upon as a more detrimental dimension of the
(7) William G and, while writing in the State Department Bulletin, December 9, 1968, 
made this observation.
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Table 3.
NET INCOME GAINED BY USA FROM IMMIGRATION OF HQM FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1970) UNDER MEDIAN ASSUMPTIONS 
(Unit =  1000 US Dollars)
G ro ss incom e 
gained  per 
im m igrant
Incom e 
lo st  per 
im m igrant
N et income 
gained per 
im m igrant
N um ber of 
im m igrants
T o ta l 
N e t gain
Social Scientists 253 23 230 471 108,330
Natural Scientists 258 23 235 2,154 506,190
Engineers 297 44 253 6,400 1,619,200
Physicians 690 44 646 2,211 1,248,306
Total 11,236 3,662,026
Source: Unctad, Reverse Transfer of Technology, as quoted in Mainstream, No. 16, 
1974, p. 45.
brain drain problem. It is estimated that the social benefit to U.S.A. is more 
than three times as great as the social cost to India as a result of brain 
drain [8 ] . Foreign capital investment by DCs ensures the principal along 
with interest; but the outflow of HQM from LDCs constitutes a permanent 
loss. Whatever foreign aid is given by the DCs is more than taken away by 
the shrewd trade practices, unfavourable terms of trade, high rate of in­
terest and royalty charges.
The UNCTAD study on the reverse transfer of technology has made 
it abundantly clear that the net income transfer from the developing 
countries to the U.S. in the form of brain drain is a massive amount. 
It is also interesting to note that some of the biggest contribution are made 
by countries that are among the poorest in the developing world itself. 
As a matter fact, the reverse flow of technology nullifies the tall claim for 
neo-imperialist aid to Third World.
The loss of technology is more harmful than the loss of skill, and it 
will account for the widening gap between rich and poor areas and will 
also reduce the capacity of the LDCs to borrow and assimilate foreign 
technology. In fact, U.S.A. never exports the current and improved tech­
nology to LDCs, but she only parts with the technology of old vintage [2 5 ]. 
The DCs are trying to help economic development of LDCs, but on the 
other hand, enacting immigration laws that encourage the flight of skilled 
labour from poor countries. The process of brain drain has become 
faster since the change in U.S. Immigration Laws in 1965. Foreign aid 
to LDCs opens up a channel for professionals to emigrate in a way that 
cannot be attacked within the present order of power relations and the
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technology imposed on the LDCs is wholly inappropriate. The amount of 
aid given to LDCs is far less than the amount of HQM drawn away 
from them.
Other things remaining the same, brain drain in a country following 
a colonial development policy remains high. The colonial legacy can be 
witnessed in many LDCs even today in different walks of life, e.g., in the 
education system, in the application of technology, in wage structure and 
so forth. Lack of indigenous value premise and borrowed technology make 
a class of strange self-centered professionals who remain disintegrated 
from the main stream of life and become always ready to emigrate from 
the country. Educational and cultural domination by the DCs give further 
encouragement to brain drain. The DCs woo away the brains from LDCs 
by giving financial temptation. But such brains never work for their own 
countries. In fact, what our scientists do is decided outside and has no 
relevance for India [2 0 ]. Much is being done in India in the area of 
fundamental research at a very low cost for the U .S.A .( ). In the name 
of research collaboration with LDCs, the developed capitalist countries 
are dangerously using the human, non human and ecological resources of 
the backward countries. This is evident in many joint projects undertaken 
in India. DDT and Filaria research in India has been done with the help 
of Indian scientists but with no benefit to India. Malaria and Filaria have 
appeared once again in India. Indian scholars neglect important areas of 
research and simply follow the dictates of the western powers still now. 
Examples are abundant to show that in the pretext of helping India, the 
DCs are in fact exploiting our country and are getting fully the acquiescence 
of a scientific bureaucracy and technological neo-imperialism.
In the field of technology, the western models are promiscuously applied. 
Technology transfer form LDCs to DCs is denied by the latter on the 
ground that knowledge is a universal public good. But it is strange that 
the same notion about knowledge is not entertained by the DCs in the 
matter of patent which is the embodiment of the universal knowledge. Out 
of 3 million current patents in the world, LDCs hold only 30 thousand. If 
knowledge is a public good, why do the DCs charge for the export of tech­
nology which is based on knowledge? The answer to this question smacks 
of clear neo-imperialistic design which admits of no humanitarian or moral 
consideration about the struggle for economic development by the LDCs.
When all is said and done, we can zero in on the discussion by 
mentioning the most of the more important effects of brain drain and 
brain overflow side by side.
(8) The empirical examples of U.S. domination over India education are given in 
Binoy Kumar Roy, U.S. Infiltration in Indian Education, New Delhi, 1974.
BRAIN MIGRATION FRO M  THIRD WORLD 367
Brain Overflow
1. Decreases educated unemployment.
2. No loss in the short run.
3. No loss of saving and investment.
4. Does not affect average education 
and research.
5. Does not affect marginal producti­
vity and wage of the non-migrants.
6. Removes the loss since the brain 
was unemployed.
7. Income gain is absolute as there 
is no output loss.
8. Income gain is greater than capital 
loss.
9. Gain of state revenue, as marginal 
cost of public goods provided is 
greater than tax revenue which 
is zero.
10. Remittances add to saving and 
investment and are large. Remit­
tances cover almost the entire 
public and private costs.
11. No question of compensation as 
non-migrants are not losers. 123
12. Does not hamper the growth 
process, rather helps it in the 
short run.
13. The effect is, in general, welfare 
increasing for the non-migrants.
Brain Drain
May increase unemployment.
Loss in the short run.
Loss of saving and investment. 
Affects education and research.
Initially increases wage and marginal 
productivity of the non-migrants; 
but ultimately decreases them.
Removes the surplus since marginal 
productivity was higher than the 
wage.
Output loss is greater than income 
gain.
Capital loss is greater than income 
gain.
Loss of net revenue for the state, 
as tax is greater than marginal cost 
of public goods provided.
Remittances meagre and mostly 
spent on conspicuous consumption. 
Remittances cover only the private 
cost.
Non migrants are losers but there 
is no compulsory system to compen­
sate the loss — remittances are vo­
luntary and are inadequate.
Hampers the growth process in 
the short run.
The effect is welfare reducing for 
the domestic economy as a whole.
The effects of brain migration from LDCs are overwhelmingly large 
and varied, and as such, are not capable of being stated in a generalised 
manner. A meaningful study of the effects must take into account inter alia, 
the type of brain migration, the state of economic development, the time 
dimension and the short run and long run economic desiderata of the
368 B. N. GHOSH
country. It is very essential to specify clearly the objective function the 
country wants to maximise during the given period of time. For instance, 
if the country wants to maximise employment as the objective function, 
brain overflow may be a welcome proposition, but if the country desires 
to maximise growth, brain drain becomes an important constraint. 
However, the objective function itself is a function of many factors and 
sometimes it becomes too difficult to objectively determine the objective 
function.
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LA M IGRAZIONE DEI CERVELLI DAL TERZO MONDO: ANALISI 
DELLE IMPLICANZE Si
Si è guardato alle conseguenze della migrazione dei cervelli da due direzioni 
diverse. Il punto di vista nazionalista considera la sottrazione di cervelli come 
un processo che rallenta il reddito, la crescita e il benessere di un sistema e 
promuove l’ineguaglianza tra paesi. Secondo una prospettiva più internazionale, 
la migrazione di cervelli risponde a un processo naturale di ottimizzazione di 
reddito, di benessere e di sviluppo. Conduce all’eguaglianza dei prezzi dei fattori, 
favorisce l’allocazione ottimale del capitale umano e la divisione del lavoro sul 
piano internazionale. Entrambe le vedute implicano però enormi malintesi 
concettuali, giacché chiamano sottrazione di cervelli (brain drain) ciò che tale 
non è.
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Lo scambio o l’esportazione di cervelli sono fenomeni migratori di reciproco 
beneficio ai paesi che li attuano e realizzano processi attraverso i quali i paesi in 
via di sviluppo possono raggiungere significativi risultati economici. In parti­
colare, lo sbocco migratorio di cervelli in eccesso non conduce a riduzioni di 
prodotto, giacché la loro produttività marginale è nulla. Situazioni di eccesso 
corrispondono infatti a disoccupazione di risorse, che, attraverso l ’esportazione, 
realizzano un potenziale di risparmio spesso di considerevole rilievo.
Il caso della sottrazione di cervelli è invece diverso e corrisponde alla fuga 
di forze di lavoro che già occupano posizioni strategiche in un sistema. In tal 
caso la fuga di cervelli si accompagna necessariamente a perdite considerevoli 
di capitale incorporato nell’uomo e influisce negativamente sui processi di 
apprendimento ossia di formazione di un tale capitale. Il processo di crescita 
di un paese ne soffre.
La fuga o sottrazione di cervelli è una forma di sfruttamento perpetrata 
dai paesi piu sviluppati ai danni delle economie in via di sviluppo. Deriva e 
s’intensifica con le politiche neoimperialistiche di quei paesi. Senza alcun com­
penso oggigiorno i paesi avanzati sottraggono risorse umane ai paesi poveri 
in luogo di materie prime o di capitale fisico. Il lavoro esamina gli effetti prin­
cipali della fuga dei cervelli e individua le variabili che debbono figurare nello 
studio del fenomeno.
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Abstract
Many less developed countries are saddled with a serious shortage 
of foreign currency. This has had an effect of slowing down their attempt 
for economic growth. From a long run perspective, any LDC that wishes 
to achieve and maintain a reasonable growth rate must find ways to earn 
enough foreign currencies to fnance its development needs. Yet, reserve 
saved is as good as reserve earned at least from a short run viewpoint. 
Every year much foreign currency reserves are drained in financing impor­
tation of food and energy and in accommodating debt servicing. This 
paper discusses these problems and attempts to find ways to lessen the 
reserve drainage.
Introduction
During the 1970s the gross national product of less developed 
countries (LDCs) grew at an annual rate of 5.5% , but because of con­
tinued growth in population, their per capita income grew only at 2 .8% . 
Although the LDCs’ growth rate of per capita income was comparable 
to that of the developed countries (DCs), the rate indicated that the 
absolute gap in the standard of living between LDCs and DCs further 
increased during the decade. The slow growth rate in LDCs’ per capita
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income, coupled with the absolutely low level of income, implies that for 
a foreseeable future many LDCs will suffer from concomitant phenomena 
of poverty such as disease, malnutrition, poor health, illiteracy, urban 
miseries and hopelessness. All the nations, the rich and the poor alike, 
see the need for accelerated growth for LDCs if the world is to attain 
economic, social and political stability. The ambitious goals of the United 
Nations Third Development Decade, in which the growth rates of LDCs’ 
GNP and per capita income for the 1980s were set at 7%  and 4.5%  
respectively, attest the need and the concern for an accelerated growth. 
Whether the actual performance of LDCs in this decade will surpass that 
of the last is yet to be seen.
Economic development requires an enormous amount of capital. 
Part of it can be attained internally through domestic saving. However, 
the vicious circle of low income-low saving makes it difficult for many 
LDCs to attain sufficient amount of capital internally. Part of capital can 
be supplied externally by DCs through direct foreign investment, loans 
and aid. What concerns many countries is that there has been a considerable 
slackening in the supply of foreign capital in recent years for a number 
of reasons: the world-wide economic recession, political instability in 
some parts of the world, continuing deficits and increased credit riskiness 
in many LDCs, and high interest rates and more stringent conditions on 
loans demanded by DCs.
This background directs our attention to the third avenue of obtaining 
development capital, namely earning foreign currency reserves through 
greater efforts for exporting and controlling imports. The policies to 
control imports in the 1960s, known as the import substitution, however, 
w-ere not very successful because resources were channeled to wrong 
directions through tariff and non-tariff protection of inefficient industries 
of domestic import substitutes. On the other hand, the policies of encou­
raging exports in the 1970s, notably tariff preferences, encountered con­
siderable resistance among DCs due to DCs’ own policies of protecting 
labor-intensive industries. It is with this background that we turn our 
attention to the problems of food, energy and debt servicing that haunt 
many LDCs, with a view of saving reserves so that the scarce resources 
can be used for importation of capital goods and technology, and for 
upgrading human resources of LDCs.
I. Food and Agriculture
In view of absolute poverty and low income that exist in LDCs, the 
most imminent problem in LDCs is an increase in food production.
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Lack of adequate food has contributed to disease, malnutrition and poor 
health in LDCs. Malnutrition and disease adversely affect labor produc­
tivity both in rural and urban sectors, which in turn, hamper efforts 
for economic development. And yet many LDCs whose mode of produc­
tion is agricultural have become dependent on imported foods. In view of 
the fact that many LDCs suffer from balance of payments deficits and 
shortage in foreign currency reserves, it is imperative that productivity 
in agriculture and food production must be drastically increased.
In making greater efforts for food and agricultural production, LDCs 
must face a number of problems. Food and agricultural production are 
vulnerable to weather conditions. Since agricultural products are known 
to be price inelastic, they are also subject to wide price fluctuations. On 
the other hand, improvement in agricultural productivity is slow and a 
greater number of LDCs have become importers of food in recent years. 
This trend is likely to continue in the future. According to an estimate 
made by the Food and Agricultural Organization, LD C’s need for grain 
imports will reach 72 million tons and the need for DCs’s food aid to 
cover LDCs’ domestic production and food imports will reach 15 or 16 
million tons by 1985. In contrast, DCs aided LDCs in grains by 9.7 million 
tons in the 1978-79 grain year (July-June).
In order to raise agricultural productivity, DCs have provided various 
technical assistance to LDCs through bilateral and multilateral agreements 
and through exchange of technicians. One obstacle for permeation of 
agricultural technology has been the reluctance for introducing new 
agricultural techniques on the part of farmers in LDCs and the lack of 
basic education and low rates of illiteracy that are more serious in the 
rural area than in the cities.
Efforts have been made for research and development in agriculture to 
produce high-yield crops by national and international organizations. The 
Green Revolution in the 1960s is the most notable example, through which 
some LDCs succeeded in producing high yield rice and other grains. 
However, a lack of rural infrastructure such as irrigation and transportation 
systems is a serious obstacle for rural development.
There is a great need for a greater use of fertilizers and pesticides 
if acreage output is to be improved. The recent increase in the oil prices 
have contributed to the rise in the price of fertilizer and pesticide and 
made it more difficult for farmers to obtain them. For countries that 
do not have domestic chemical industries and thus must depend on imported 
fertilizer, the increase in the price of fertilizer has further contributed 
to an adverse balance of payments position. A greater adoptation of
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agricultural machines and equipment is also a prerequisite for increased 
production. DCs have assisted LDCs in providing more fertilizer, agricul­
tural machines and building fertilizer plants through various grants 
and aids.
Land reform is another major task that must be faced by many 
LDCs. It takes a long-term investment to build an irrigation system and 
to improve the quality of land, but landless tenants lack incentives to 
carry out such long-term projects.
The importance of cooperatives must also be emphasized. Activities 
such as planning in production, rationalization of marketing and distribution, 
provision of credit and permeation of agricultural technology can be 
facilitated by encouraging and assisting establishment of cooperatives.
It has often been pointed out that unrealistic price policies in food 
designed to help urban dwellers have provided a disincentive to farmers 
for an increase in agricultural production. Chronic flow of excessive 
quantities of aid in food from DCs may have discouraged local farmers 
by narrowing the market and depressing prices in LDCs. It is necessary 
for many LDCs to review their price policies and reintroduce market 
incentives if they are deemed necessary. I.
II. Energy
LDCs’ energy consumption accounted for only 12% of the total 
world energy consumption of 137.8 million barrels/day in oil equivalent 
in 1980. The consumption has been increasing at an annual rate of 6 .2% , 
higher than that for DCs which stood at 3.9% . This indicates that the 
share of the world energy consumption by LDCs will increase in the future 
as their economy and population grow and urbanization and industriali­
zation continue. The potential energy endowment of non-oil producing 
LDCs is not very encouraging. While LDCs have 34.8%  of the world 
total potential in hydroelectric power, their share in oil, natural gas and 
coal remains extremely low: 1.4% , 3.2%  and 2.1%  respectively, according 
to a report by the World Bank. Availability of oil, or lack of it, has serious 
implications for economic development of non-oil producing LDCs. First, 
the need for oil imports provides a drag for the balance of payment deficits 
and drains foreign currency reserves that can otherwise be used for 
importing capital goods and technology necessary for economic development. 
Since 1972 the price of oil has increased by 14 times in nominal value 
and five times in real value by 1980. Non-oil producing LDCs paid $7
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billion in imported oil in 1973. The amount reached $67 billion in 1980. 
The increase in the oil price affects LDCs not only directly through larger 
import bills for oil, but also indirectly through a rise in the price of 
imported manufactured goods. The impact is particularly adversely felt 
for low income LDCs whose exports are mostly primary goods and there­
fore, cannot transfer the burden of the high cost of imports by raising 
the price of primary goods. The World Bank estimates that the import 
bill for oil by LDCs will grow at least to $230 billion in 1990, assuming 
3% of annual rate of increase in the oil price.
The higher price of oil has also contributed to high inflation rates 
for many LDCs. Although LDCs’ consumption of oil is small in absolute 
quantity relative to DCs’, the ratio of oil consumption against LDCs’s 
GNP is substantially higher than that for DCs. Excessive inflation in LDCs 
therefore is likely to have serious impact on the standard of living in LDCs.
The energy problem will affect agricultural development and techno­
logical innovation in agriculture. Operation of agricultural machines and 
irrigation systems require oil, which in turn, will increase the production 
cost in agriculture as the oil price rises. The rise in the price of fertilizer 
and pesticide due to the higher price of oil, or difficulty in obtaining them, 
will adversely affect agriculture. The energy problem affects LDCs 
efforts for industrialization as well, especially in developing energy-inten­
sive industries such as the heavy industry and the chemical industry. 
Industrialization must be proceeded by taking into account the continuing 
increase in the energy price. Efficient use of energy will become a primary 
concern in selecting production processes, types of energy and size of 
plant. Alteration in the transportation system may also be required, 
shifting away from the use of automobiles toward a mass transportation 
system based on railways. Overall economic plans in LDCs must establish 
an optimal energy supply based on scarcity and high price of energy. I.
III . Debt Servicing
Because of inadequate domestic saving and chronic deficits in the 
balance of payments, many LDCs must depend on foreign capital. If their 
economies continue to grow in correspondence to the increase in foreign 
debt, their ability for debt amortization may not be seriously affected. 
However, in the light of huge deficits in the balance of payments and 
precipitous accumulation of their debt in LDCs, some DCs have begun 
to wonder if LDCs’ debt accumulation has not exceeded the ability for 
servicing for some countries.
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Needless to say, OPEC members’ surplus in the current account 
sharply increased from $7.5 billion in 1973 to $59.5 billion in 1974 due 
to the quadrupling of the oil price. The OPEC surplus since decreased to 
$4.5 billion in 1978 due to the ambitious policies of industrialization and 
the recession in DCs which the precipitous increase in the oil price had 
exacerbated. However, a large increase in the oil price in 1978 has 
again brought huge surpluses in the OPEC members current account.
Meanwhile, deficits in the current account of non-oil producing LDCs 
increased from $7.5 billion in 1973 to $26.0 billion in 1974. Deficits 
decreased temporarily in 1976 and 1977 due to the boom in the com­
modity market but again increased in 1978. Their deficits totaled $34.5 
billion and $49.5 billion in 1979 and 1980 respectively.
The chronic deficits of non-oil producing LDCs and rapid industria­
lization of OPEC countries have both contributed to huge debt accumu­
lation in the 1970s. The total deficit accumulated stood at $86.6 billion 
in 1971, which grew to $451.0 billion in 1980 in nominal value. This was 
an eight-fold increase in the debt outstanding over ten years. Approximately 
20%  of the debt accumulated was incurred by OPEC nations despite their 
huge oil revenue. This is due to an increase in export credit from DCs 
to finance imports of plants and other capital goods needed for industria­
lization. When the nominal value of debt accumulation is deflated by the 
1971 export price index for industrial goods from DCs, the resulting real 
value of debt outstanding of all LDCs was $158.6 billion.
Among total loans provided to LDCs by the DCs’ governments and 
private sectors, there has been a trend for official development assistance 
(ODA) to decline and commercial loans to increase. Whereas ODA’s share 
was 37.4% of total loans, it was 22.6%  in 1980. Since ODA is provided 
at concessional terms, this trend has made the LDC’s overall burden of 
loans heavier than before. The difficulty is reflected in the discrepancy 
that while debt outstanding increased by 5.2 times during 1971-80, 
amortization increased by 8.1 times. Of the total amortization in 1980, 
ODA loans accounted for only 5.7%  as compared to 13.8% in 1971. 
The decreasing proportion of ODA amortization indicates the increasing 
role that private financial institutions have played in financing LDCs’ 
development since the first oil crisis of 1973.
There has also been a tendency for loans to concentrate on a few 
countries among LDCs. Three countries, Brazil, Mexico and Algeria alone 
accounted for 26.2%  of total debt outstanding. Top ten countries amassed 
51.5% of the total loans outstanding in 1979. This trend for concen­
tration continued throughout the 1970s.
In the light of pressing need for development capital and chronic 
deficits in the balance of payments on one hand and mounting debt accu­
mulation on the other, DCs have occasionally provided rescheduling for 
debt servicing to LDCs. How much foreign loan a country can absorb 
rests on complex factors such as its GNP, current accounts, economic 
policies, political stability and resource endowment. However, an imme­
diate concern is how to recycle huge oil revenues accumulated by OPEC 
countries through the Euro-dollar market and international agencies. 
According to an OECD report, oil producing countries had oustanding 
assets of $236 billion in 1979 on top of the surplus of $114 billion in 
the current account in 1980. There has been a concern that unlike the 
years that followed the oil crisis of 1973, the oil producing nations may 
not be in a spending mood this time around. They have learnt that a 
precipitous increase in development programs may induce adverse conse­
quence in the domestic economy such as runaway inflation and a bottleneck 
in the social infrastructure. At any rate, the private sector is likely to 
continue to play an important role in recycling the petrodollar through 
the provision of loans, export credits and direct investment.
Although the DCs’ governments and international financial organiza­
tions can play a greater role in assisting LDCs for their efforts for economic 
development, the ultimate burden rests on LDCs themselves. They must 
strengthen their economy and must take the advice of IMF and other 
international organizations in carrying out the structural adjustment in 
their economy. From a broader perspective, providing debt relief does 
not contribute to a long term solution.
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Conclusion
LDCs have made rather substantial progress in economic growth, 
but not enough progress has been made in per capita income. Among 
many constraints for their economic development, shortage of foreign 
currency reserves has been an important one. Without reserves, many 
LDCs find themselves in difficulty in importing capital goods that are 
necessary for their economic development. Yet many LDCs spend scarce 
reserves in importing a large quantity of food despite their agricultural 
background. The recent development in the oil market has compelled 
LDCs to divert a substantial amount of reserves in importing oil. Shortage 
in reserves has necessitated LDCs to acquire official and private loans 
from DCs, which in turn compelled LDCs to spend a considerable amount 
of reserves for debt servicing.
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In the light of these recent developments, it is imperative that LDCs 
must cast a critical look at their past performance in food and agricultural 
policies, find ways to conserve energy and make every effort to reduce 
their dependence on foreign loans by increasing domestic saving. Loans, 
especially official loans, are still important until LDCs build the capacity 
to earn or save enough reserves. Debt rescheduling may be occasionally 
necessitated but frequent rescheduling in ODA may induce private capital 
to move to those countries whose burden is reduced, which is not necessarily 
desirable from the viewpoint of optimal resource allocation.
Since many DCs are becoming reluctant to supply loans because of 
the recession in the domestic economy and their perception of LDCs’ 
riskiness, it is necessary for DCs to reevaluate the importance of the policies 
of tariff preferences to be provided to LDCs. Tariff preferences can be 
considered as an efficient form of foreign aid. They are efficient because 
the cost involved on the part of DCs are relatively small and revenues 
earned by LDCs can go through the existing industrial structure of LDCs 
with a minimum economic and social disruption. In selecting commodities 
for which tariff preferences are to be provided, DCs must be aware that 
as time changes, countries’ comparative advantage change and that by 
passing DCs’ declining industries to LDCs, a more equitable income 
redistribution is made on the global scale. From the viewpoint of DC’s 
own policies of structural adjustment, it is preferable to encourage new, 
prospective industries than to protect declining industries that compete 
with products from LDCs.
The recent problems of debt accumulation and servicing remind us 
of the important role DCs’ direct foreign investment can play. Development 
capital acquired through direct investment, unlike loans, need not be 
reimbursed except that some amount of profits may leave LDCs. A point 
often missed by LDCs is that in this age of LDCs’ sovereignty and inde­
pendence, foreign investment stands for mutual benefit. No LDCs are forced 
to accept direct investment that does not provide benefits to the host 
country. It is high time for LDCs to engage in serious efforts and business­
like discussion on promoting economic development of LDCs rather than 
perpetually invoking memories of remote historical relations in the past. 
Meanwhile all DCs must make renewed efforts for achieving the goal 
of sharing 1% of their GNP with LDCs in various forms of economic 
cooperation, of which 0.7%  must be official development assistance. 
Perhaps OPEC nations and socialist countries whose aid amounted to 
7.3%  and 2.5%  of all aids respectively in 1979, can play a greater role 
in assisting LDCs’ efforts for economic development.
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ALIM ENTI, ENERGIA E SERVIZIO DEL DEBITO QUALI VINCOLI 
ALLE RISERVE E  ALLO SVILUPPO DEI PAESI MENO SVILUPPATI
Diversi paesi sottosviluppati sperimentano situazioni di seria carenza di 
valuta estera. Questo fatto ha avuto l’effetto di frenare i loro sforzi diretti allo 
sviluppo dell’economia. In un quadro di lungo periodo, ogni paese arretrato 
che ambisca a raggiungere e conservare un tasso di crescita ragionevole deve 
trovare la maniera di procurarsi flussi di valuta sufficienti al finanziamento 
delle necessità di sviluppo. Tuttavia nel breve andare le riserve risparmiate 
servono altrettanto bene delle riserve guadagnate. Ogni anno una gran quantità 
di riserve di valuta estera vengono assorbite nel finanziamento di importazioni 
di alimenti e di energia e nel soddisfare le ragioni dei creditori esteri del paese. 
Il presente lavoro discute il problema soprattutto sotto il profilo della politica 
economica e della possibilità di trovare strade per alleviare l’assorbimento di 
riserve su questi fronti.
RECENSIONI (ROOK-REVIEWS)
Demaria G.: Elementi di critica economica. Recensioni Comparazioni e Indicazioni Biblio­
grafiche, raccolte per la prima volta da Achille Agnati e Aldo Montesano con una 
Introduzione e dai medesimi annotate, Padova, Cedam, 1983, f. 8 °, pp. LXXXIX-1140, 
L. 80.000.
Solo due ex assistenti, il prof. Agnati dell’Università di Padova e il prof. Montesano 
dell’Università di Milano, legati a Giovanni Demaria da lunghi anni di spirituale comunione, 
tuttora attuale, potevano cogliere la rilevanza scientifica di scritti che, inseriti in varie 
riviste e difficilmente reperibili, rappresentano veri documenti di critica economica. Si tratta 
di circa un migliaio di titoli dati in forma anastatica, ognuno dei quali fornisce spunti 
preziosi sia dal punto di vista dottrinale sia dal punto di vista umano e ambientale. L ’intelli­
gente opera di raccolta è preceduta da una Introduzione di 27 pagine che ne coglie il 
significato, invitando ad apprezzare il frutto di tanta fatica.
Il contenuto della raccolta rispetto a qualsiasi altra disponibile, ivi compresa quella 
dello stesso maestro di Demaria, Gustavo Del Vecchio, si caratterizza dal fatto di abbracciare 
un lungo periodo fra i piu intensi della mutazione dell’ambiente economico dottrinale 
(1928-78). Propagatori ed entelechiani, e cioè « l’esogeneità permanente», assumono nel quadro 
puntuale rilevanza. E ’ infatti il reticolo di propagazione che avvinghia nei suoi lacci eventi 
e fatti economici, costringendo la dottrina alla lenta trasformazione dei suoi modelli, nella 
ricerca di renderli adeguati all’interpretazione del mondo reale.
Una lettura attenta delle recensioni qui riunite può essere considerata « come guida 
sia del fluire economicistico storico-teorico del periodo, sia del divenire scientifico dell’opera 
di Demaria ». Ma altresì come la propongono ancora gli autori stessi della raccolta, « guida 
dell’evolversi dell’attività economica e. spiegazione » del fluire sistematico dell’economia 
politica dagli inizi ad oggi.
Le recensioni includono scritti rigorosamente economici accompagnati da scritti extraeco­
nomici, sempre essenziali per cogliere il milieu nell’ambito del quale si sono maturati. 
Sedici sono le classi tematiche in cui gli autori hanno suddiviso le recensioni comparse nelle 
riviste economiche piu note (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, La riforma 
sociale, Revue d ’économie politique, Cahiers Vilfredo Pareto, Kyklos, Rivista Internazionale 
di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali). Il ricordare le 16 classi significa anche cercare di 
cogliere una sintesi degli estesi interessi culturali che hanno occupato e tuttora occupano 
il Maestro. Queste le denominazioni: Biografie, Curiosità bibliografiche; Dinamica econo­
mica; Econometria; Economia marxista; Economia politica; Filosofia, metodologia e scienze 
morali, naturali, sociali; Geografia economico-politica; Istituzioni, legislazione economica e 
finanza pubblica; Metodi matematici e applicazioni; Realtà sociale e storia; Sociologia; Statistica 
teorica e applicazioni; Storia delle dottrine economiche, politiche, sociali; Storia dei fatti 
economici e statistiche economiche; Teorie monetarie, bancarie, creditizie e politica economica.
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Gli autori recensiti nelle 16 classi sono annotati in un indice analitico per classi di 
argomento, che si rivelerà prezioso, insieme all’indice cronologico per testata di pubblica­
zione, per il lettore, che cercherà la critica di Giovanni Demaria su un qualche studio che 
lo possa al momento particolarmente interessare. L ’enumerazione è seguita dall’indice dei 
nomi e inoltre dall’elenco degli scritti di Giovanni Demaria, anch’essi suddivisi secondo 
l’anno di pubblicazione. Si è offerto cosi uno strumento estremamente utile nello studio 
del pensiero del Maestro, poiché all’epoca delle singole recensioni corrispondono le relative 
preoccupazioni dottrinali dell’autore stesso. Un esempio si ha nella valutazione del linguaggio 
matematico che proprio in questo periodo ha trovato un diffuso impiego a proposito e a 
sproposito. All’eccessivo modellismo Demaria ha opposto la teoria aperta « seguendo la via 
delle approssimazioni successive », e dell’inclusione dei fatti nuovi, come sottolinea Montesano 
(p. XX). E ’ per questa ragione che piu volte ha stigmatizzato il distacco della teoria economica 
eccessivamente meccanicistica « incitando a una maggiore attenzione alla realtà economica ».
Le pubblicazioni recenti sono o di illustri economisti di altri tempi riproposti in anasta­
tica, o di economisti, pensatori e uomini d ’azione contemporanei e attuali, piu o meno 
noti, ma sempre per qualche aspetto significativi o nel pensiero economico o nella vita 
reale. I commenti che li illustrano, di volta in volta o critici, o polemici o costruttivi, 
sempre insieme incisivi e persuasivi, si trasformano in fonte di ulteriori approfondimenti. 
E  pertanto ciò che insegna la raccolta, come bene hanno sottolineato i professori Agnati 
e Montesano nell’mtroduzione (p. XI) è che « la recensione dei libri serve perché il valutare 
la ragione storica che spinge l’economista a risolvere un problema economico porta a 
valutare la ragione scientifica venendo analizzata la logica che ne regge la tesi ».
La fatica di una si complessa pubblicazione sarà certo adeguatamente apprezzata dal 
prof. Demaria, ancor oggi nel pieno della sua attività scientifica. Con la dedica si chiude 
l’introduzione dei suoi allievi: «Al Maestro Demaria dedichiamo, secondo la consapevole audacia 
della lealtà interpersonale della sua Scuola, questo lavoro di lunga e appassionata pazienza ».
Marialuisa Manfredini G asparetto
Scagliola Domenico: Procedure concorsuali. 1983, Messina, Edas - Edizioni Dott. Anto­
nino Sfameni, 2 voli., p. 913, s.i.p.
L ’opera contiene il testo di tutte le decisioni della Corte Costituzionale in materia di 
procedure concorsuali dal 1956 al 1983, nonché,di tutte le ordinanze di rinvio alla Corte stessa.
Essa si divide in tre parti riguardanti:
A) questioni di legittimità costituzionale delle norme penali concorsuali o dell’intero R.D. 
16 marzo 1942 n. 267, contenente la disciplina del fallimento e delle altre procedure 
concorsuali;
B) questioni di legittimità costituzionale relative a singoli articoli del citato decreto n. 267 
(i provvedimenti sono raggruppati articolo per articolo);
C) questioni di legittimità costituzionale relative a singoli articoli della L. 3 aprile 1979, 
n. 95 (e successive integrazioni e modificazioni) relative aH’amministrazione straordinaria 
delle grandi imprese in crisi.
La raccolta è completa e di agevole consultazione. Può pertanto essere un utile 
strumento di informazione per studiosi e pratici delle materie concorsuali.
R. N.
LIBR I RICEVUTI (BOOKS RECEIVED)
Pinto Diana (ed.): Contemporary Italian Sociology. A Reader. 1981, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 233, Lst. 20.000.
Part I. The Labour Market (M. Paci, E. Pugliese, F. Ferrarotti, M. Barbagli). — Part. II. 
Social Classes (A. Pizzorno, C. Donolo). — Part III. Social Actors and Politics (E. Reyneri, 
A. Melucci). — Part IV. Dualism, the Welfare State and Market Economy (L. Balbo, 
M. Paci).— Part V. Appendix (V. Capecchi). — Index.
Reed John: Ten Days That Shook the World. 1982, Harmondsworth, Penguin 
Books, pp. 351, Lst. 1.95.
Introduction (A. J. P. Taylor). — Introduction (V. I. Lenin). — Preface. — Chronology. — 
Notes and Explanations. — Background. — The Coming Storm. — On the Eve. — The 
Fall of the Provisional Government. — Plunging Ahead. — The Committee for Salvation. — 
The Revolutionary Front. — Counter-Revolution. — Victory. — Moscow. — The Conquest 
of Power. — The Peasants’ Congress. — Appendixes.
Reiffers Jean-Louis et al.: Sociétés transnationales et développement endogène. 
1981, Paris, Unesco, pp. 288, F. 75.
Introduction générale. — I. Aperçu général des effets des sociétés transnationales sur le 
développement socio-culturel. —  1. Une force économique contre une idée: la STN et son 
contrepoint, le développement endogène. — 2. Le conflit stratégique STN - État-nation. — 
3. L ’évolution du système d’interactions: le rôle des valeurs culturelles, de la communication, 
de l’éducation, de la science et de la technologie. — IL  Les effets des STN sur les valeurs 
culturelles, la communication, l ’éducation, la science et la technologie. — 4. L ’influence des 
STN sur les valeurs culturelles, la communication et la consommation dans les pays en 
développement. — 5. L ’influence des STN sur l’éducation. — 6. Le rôle des STN dans les 
pays en développement: la science et la technologie. — Conclusion générale. — Biblio­
graphie générale.
Román Zoltán: Productivity and Economie Growth. 1982, Budapest, Akadémiai 
Kiadó, pp. 276, $ 27.50.
Part. I. The concept and measurement of productivity. —  1. The concept of productivity in 
economic theories. — 2. The concept of productivity in everyday economic life. — 3. Pro-
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ductivity in economie statistics: methods and problems of measurement. — 4. Productivity 
analysis by means of input-output tables. — Part II. Economic growth. 5. The concept and 
measurement of economic growth. — 6. Long-term growth trends. — 7. The relative level 
of development and productivity. — Part III. Sources of growth. —  8. Explaining economic 
growth. — 9. Factors of growth. — 10. Quantification of the sources of growth. — 
Appendix. — Bibliography. — Name index. — Subject index.
Smith Adam: The Wealth of Nations. 1982, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 
pp. 538, Lst. 2.95.
Preface. — Adam Smith. — Introduction by Andrew Skinner. —- Notes to thè Introduction.
— The Wealth of Nations (Books I-III). — Further Reading.
Spaziante Vincenzo (a cura di): Le regioni nella politica dell’energia. 1982, 
Milano, Edizioni di Comunità, pp. 134, L. 8.000. Fondazione A. Olivetti, 
Quaderno di studi regionali n. 12.
Nota del curatore. — I nodi sociali e istituzionali della politica energetica (S. Ristuccia). — 
Politica dell’energia, regioni, enti locali (V. Spaziante). —- La dimensione accentrata e 
burocratica dell’attuale politica energetica (R. Zenoni). — Verso un sistema energetico 
decentrato: la cogenerazione (C. Mussa Ivaldi). — Le regioni e il risparmio d ’energia 
(R. Perez). — La riforma istituzionale del Cnen (V. M. Iorio). — I problemi di una politica 
regionale dell’energia (G. Bartolini). — Energia, istituzioni e qualità dell’ambiente (G. 
Campos Venuti). — Le esigenze del coordinamento energetico (G. Martini). — Le conven­
zioni tra Enel ed enti locali (U. Belelli). — Enti pubblici energetici ed enti locali (E. 
Realacci). — Come costruire una politica energetica regionale: il caso del Piemonte (G. 
Salerno). — La politica dell’energia in una fase di transizione (S. Sartori). — Livelli e 
funzioni di governo dell’energia (M. Cammelli). — Appendice: Le iniziative di carattere 
normativo ed operativo realizzate dalle regioni nel settore dell’energia (Regione Autonoma 
Friuli-Venezia Giulia). — Notizie sugli autori.
Timmerman Jacobo: Prisoner Without a Name, Celi Without a Number. 1982, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, pp. 164, Lst. 1.75.
Thuron Lester C.: Alle origini dell’ineguaglianza. I meccanismi della distribu­
zione del reddito nell’economia statunitense. 1982, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 
pp. 269, L. 16.000.
Presentazione di A. Del Boca. — Introduzione all’edizione italiana di L. C. Thurow (1980).
— Introduzione. Il gioco economico. — 1. Il risultato del gioco economico. — L ’equità 
economica. — III. Aspetti contradditori del mercato del lavoro. — IV. La concorrenza 
per il posto di lavoro: le code. — V. La concorrenza per il posto di lavoro: la distribuzione 
dei posti di lavoro. — VI. La distribuzione della ricchezza. — V II. Discriminazione e teorie 
della determinazione del reddito. — V ili .  Le implicazioni di politica economica. — 
Appendice. Una guida pratica alla teoria della produttività marginale.
R E L A Z I O N I  DI  B I L A N C I O
Banca Popolare di Novara
Società cooperativa a responsabilità limitata 
Sede sociale e centrale in Novara 
Registro Società Tribunale di Novara n. 1
Domenica 25 marzo 1984 si è tenuta in Novara l ’ASSEMBLEA ORDINARIA E STRAORDINARIA della 
BANCA POPOLARE DI NOVARA, con l ’intervento di n. 3.407 Soci.
Il Presidente, Cav. Gr. Croce avv. Roberto Di Tieri, sintetizzati gli aspetti più significativi dell’economia 
nazionale ed internazionale del 1983 e, in particolare, quelli relativi all'attività bancaria, ha illustrato 
l ’andamento operativo e le risultanze aziendali de ll’esercizio 1983, che così si compendiano:
— gli impieghi hanno raggiunto la consistenza di L. 4.826,5 miliardi, con un incremento di 849,7 miliardi 
(+21,37%) rispetto alla fine de ll’esercizio precedente:
— la massa fiduciaria, nello stesso arco di tempo, è salita a 13.820,9 miliardi, con l ’incremento del 
13,75%;
— il patrimonio sociale, compresi I Fondi Rischi, si è portato a 1.006,5 miliardi, con una crescita del 
34,00% sulla consistenza di fine 1982;
— nella compagine sociale sono stati ammessi nel corso del 1983 n. 5409 nuovi Soci: la consistenza 
a fine anno è di n. 108.416 unità, intestatarie di n. 37.692.056 azioni;
— l’utile netto è risultato di L. 44.396.630.234 e consente la distribuzione di un dividendo di L. 700 
nette per azione.
Quanto sopra ha trovato riscontro nella « Relazione » del Collegio dei Sindaci, letta dal Presidente 
del Collegio stesso, Avv. Giulio Cesare Allegra.
Aperta la discussione hanno preso la parola, nell’ordine i Soci: Di Sisto Orsogna, De Zotti, Damonte, 
Jarach, Lombardini, Risé, Moré, Piccoli, Agazzi, Bellezza.
Il Presidente Di Tieri e l ’Amministratore Delegato Venini hanno risposto agli intervenuti fornendo 
le relative delucidazioni.
Posti in votazione, sono stati approvati le Relazioni degli Amministratori e dei Sindaci, il Bilancio 
dell'esercizio 1983 con relativo Conto Economico e la proposta di riparto de ll’utile netto.
In sede straordinaria, dopo gli interventi dei Soci: Bellezza, Moré, Agazzi, Damonte, Cesari, Ricci e 
Mairano, ai quali il Presidente Di Tieri e l ’Amministratore Delegato Venini hanno fornito ampi chiarimenti, 
l ’Assemblea ha approvato la modifica degli articoli 2, 3, 7, 12, 13, 15, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 35, 36, 
38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 50, e la soppressione degli articoli 4, 5, 6 dello Statuto Sociale.
Il proposto aumento di capitale sociale, è stato approvato, sempre In sede straordinaria, secondo 
le seguenti modalità (con riferimento alle azioni in circolazione alla data del 31 ottobre 1983):
— Emissione a pagamento di nuove azioni da nominali L. 500, da offrire in opzione ai Soci in ragione di 
una azione nuova per ogni azione posseduta, al prezzo unitario di L. 10.000, di cui L. 9.500 a titolo 
di sovrapprezzo;
— emissione gratuita di nuove azioni del valore nominale di L. 500 da distribuire ai Soci in ragione 
di una azione nuova ogni due azioni possedute;
— determinazione di un rimborso spese di L. 20 per ogni azione di nuova emissione, sia essa gratuita 
o a pagamento.
Dopo le votazioni assembleari le cariche sociali risultano così costituite:
CONSIGLIO DI AMMINISTRAZIONE: Presidente: Avv. Roberto Di Tieri; Vice Presidenti: Prof. avv. Cajo 
Enrico Balossini e Dott. rag. Alberto Ricevuti; Amministratore Delegato: Cavaliere del Lavoro rag. Lino 
Venini; Consiglieri: Avv. Giulio Cesare Allegra, Prof. ing. Sergio Baratti, Cavaliere del Lavoro dott. Achille 
Boroli, Dott. rag. Giovanni Brignone, Avv. Marco Broggi, Avv. Antonio Bussi, Cavaliere del Lavoro dott. 
Luigi Buzzi, Cavaliere del Lavoro Conte dott. Alessandro Cicogna Mozzoni, Avv. Claudio Cocito, Dott. 
Edoardo Gregotti, Dott. notaio Federico Guasti, Cavaliere del Lavoro dott. Guido Maggia, Cavaliere del 
Lavoro Mario Pavesi, Dott. ing. Pietro Stella.
COLLEGIO DEI SINDACI: Presidente: Dott. Carlo Dulio; Sindaci Effettivi: Avv. Aldo Avondo, Dott. ing. 
Luigi Buscaglia, Prof. Giovanni Frattini, Rag. Giuseppe Scarpia; Sindaci Supplenti: Prof. Sergio De Angeli 
e Avv. Franco Zanetta.
COLLEGIO DEGLI ARBITRI: Effettivi: Dott. arch. Giuseppe Bronzini, Avv. Giovanni Scolari, Avv. Vittorio 
Tarditi; Arbitri Supplenti: Prof. Dott. Pietro Angelo Cerri, Avv. Francesco Fizzotti, Rag. Alberto Gramegna.
Il dividendo di L. 700 per azione è pagabile dal giorno 26 marzo 1984 presso tutti gli sportelli della Banca.
Gfre chiane alla Mstmfiducia.
I  I 122° esercizio dell’Istituto si è chiuso con un utile netto di 
J  L 7.785 milioni, comprensivo degli apporti della Gestione di 
Credito Fondiario e della Sezione Opere Pubbliche. La raccolta 
bancaria e obbligazionaria ha sfiorato i 4.710 miliardi, con un au­
mento assoluto di 781 miliardi e relativo del 20%. Con riguardo 
all’attività di investimento va evidenziato che gli interventi com­
plessivi dell’Azienda bancaria e delle Sezioni hanno raggiunto i 
3.176 miliardi, cioè il 16% in più del 1982. La compagine patrimo­
niale della Cassa si è ulteriormente rafforzata ed è risultata, dopo 
l’attribuzione degli utili, pari a 262 miliardi rispetto ai 190 miliardi 
del precedente esercizio.
(milioni di lire)
Cassa ed altre disponibilità 1.213.789 Depositi e conti correnti 3.585.194
Titoli e partecipazioni 1.700.994 Cartelle e obbligazioni 1.124.228
Impieghi Azienda bancaria 2.154.701 Utile netto 7.785
Impieghi Sezioni annesse 1.021.218 Fondi patrimoniali 261.999
S K f K M S S A
CASSA CENTRALE DI RISPARMIO VE. PER LE PROVINCE SICILIANE
229 sportelli in Sicilia
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BANCA CENTRALE DI CREDITO POPOLARE
Sede in Milano - Corso Europa n. 20 
Iscritta al tribunale di Milano al n. 53177
Il 13 aprile 1984, nella sede sociale di Corso Europa n. 20, in Milano, 
si è riunita In seconda convocazione, sotto la presidenza del Cavaliere 
del Lavoro Lino Venini, l'Assemblea ordinaria e straordinaria dei Soci 
della Centrobanca.
In sede ordinaria l'Assemblea ha approvato il bilancio relativo all'eser­
cizio 1983, che si chiude con un utile netto di L. 20.594.769.740 (comprese 
L. 1.208.798.181 quale utile netto della Sezione di Credito Agrario)' il 
dividendo è stato deliberato nella misura del 10% in ragione d'anno. 
Al 31.12.1983 gli impieghi in essere ammontano a L. 2.502,5 miliardi 
e i mezzi amministrati a L. 4.589,1 miliardi.
Per effetto della conversione della seconda franche di L. 25 miliardi 
del prestito obbligazionario convertibile di originarie L. 100 miliardi 
e di adeguati accantonamenti a riserva ed ai fondi rischi, il patrimonio 
3f/12 /ia982^1/12/1983 MSulta di L' 300’1 miliardi U~ 235,6 miliardi al
Il capitale sociale è esclusivamente posseduto da Banche Popolari 
dislocate sull intero territorio nazionale. '
A seguito della rinuncia dalla carica di Sindaco Effettivo del siqnor 
Franco Gazzola, l'Assemblea dei Soci ha provveduto ad integrare il 
collegio Sindacale con la nomina del signor Giovanni Salsi.
In sede straordinaria l'Assemblea ha approvato modifiche ad alcuni 
articoli dello Statuto sociale.
Gli Organi sociali sono così composti:
U onm f'v d ÌDAm™ nÌstrazione: Presidente Cavaliere del Lavoro Lino 
Venini, Vice Presidenti i signori Lorenzo Suardi e Aldo Cova; Consiglieri
A n tn n m 'rV n iT r1-r Bellemo' Franco Carniglia, Giovanbattista Cartia,
Antonio Ceda, Gianfrancesco Del Nero, Giovanbattista Fiorentini, Anqelo 
° i,Ma^ ? ' Marcello Melani, Piero Melazzini, Carlo Pavesi 
Giuseppe Vi gorelli. 9'°  Glancarl°  Rossi' Michele Stacca,
Segretario del Consiglio è il Direttore Generale Marcello Gentile.
Collegio Sindacale: Presidente Cavaliere del Lavoro Francesco P a m lln -  
Snidaci Effettivi I signori Pietro Agnoluzzi, Ottavio Fontanesl Umberto 
Onorato O r te 'i r nn' Sa'S' : SindaC' Supplenti ' s iBnori J°sef Froschmayr.
SINTESI DEL BILANCIO CONSOLIDATO AL 31 DICEMBRE 1983 
(in miliardi di Lire)
ATTIVO
Disponibilità e tito li 1.734,8
Impieghi in essere 2.502,5
Altri conti 638f8
4.876,1
Impegni per domande accolte 583,0
PASSIVO




Fondi da Enti ed Istituzioni 
pubbliche 33,8




Utile netto d'esercizio 20,6
4.876,1
(*) 300,1 dopo il riparto utile.
CASSA
□ I RISPARMIO 
DI ALESSANDRIA
Fondo dotazione L. 40.000 — Riserve L. 34.401.296.198
Fondata con R. Brevetto 21 agosto 1838 a scopo di beneficenza
SEDE CENTRALE: ALESSANDRIA, VIA DANTE, 2 - TEL. 30-31 (15 linee)
Dipendenze: Sede di Alessandria
Agenzie di città: A - corso Acqui, 81
B - via G. Galilei, 18 
C  - via Dossena, 38 
D - via Marengo ang. via Montegrappa
Filiali:
ARQUATA SCRIVIA - BASALUZZO - BERGAMASCO - BORGO S. MARTINO - BOSIO - 
CAMINO - CAPRIATA D'ORBA - CARPENETO - CASALCERMELLI - CASSINE CASTEL- 
CERIOLO - CASTELLAZZO B.DA - CASTELLETTO D'ORBA - CASTELNUOVO B.DA - 
CELLAMONTE - FELIZZANO - FRUGAROLO - GABIANO - MASIO - OVIGLIO - PONZONE - 
PREDOSA - QUARGNENTO - OUATTORDIO - RIVALTA B.DA - SAN GIULIANO - SAN 
SALVATORE - SEZZADIO - SOLERÒ - SPINETTA MARENGO.
Sportello presso U.S.L. Alessandria 
Sportello presso Mercato Ortofrutticolo - Alessandria 
Sportello stagionale in Voltaggio.




CASSA DI RISPARMIO DELIA PIDVINCIA DI CHIETI
FONDATA NEL 1862
L’Assemblea dei Soci della Cassa di Risparmio della Provincia di Chieti ha 
approvato il 25 marzo 1984 il rendiconto dell’esercizio (118°) chiuso il 31 dicembre 
1983 che presenta le seguenti risultanze (compresi i conti d ordine):
ATTIVO L. 1.838.487.337.243
PASSIVO L. 1.837.585.179.996 
UTILE NETTO L. 902.157.247
Principali voci di bilancio:
ATTIVO: Cassa 5.209 milioni; Corrispondenti e depositi presso altri Istituti 230.612 
milioni; Titoli di proprietà 336.373 milioni; Portafoglio 17.900 milioni; Conti correnti 
111.532 milioni; Mutui ad Enti e privati 58.836 milioni.
PASSIVO: Depositi fiduciari a risparmio ed in c/c 753.842 milioni; Corrispondenti 
19.496 milioni; Creditori diversi e partite varie 27.629 milioni; Fondi di quiescenza del 
personale 21.382 milioni; Fondi diversi 56.332 milioni; Fondi di terzi in amministrazione 
6.323 milioni; Patrimonio 39.413 milioni.
Presidente Direttore Generale
DI MARZIO Geom. Domenico Dante ____________ MELENA Dott. Gino
Direttore responsabile: Aldo Montesano - Autorizz. Tribunale di Treviso N. 113 del 22-10-54
LA NOSTRA PRESENZA NEL MONDO
Filiali: Abu Dhabi - Cairo - Chicago 
Londra - Los Angeles - Madrid 
New York - Rio de Janeiro - San Paolo 
Singapore - Tokyo
Uffici di rappresentanza:
Ankara - Atene - Beirut - Belgrado 
Berlino RDT - Bruxelles 
Buenos Aires - Cairo - Caracas
Città del Messico - Francoforte s.M. 
Hong Kong - Mosca - Parigi - Pechino 
Sydney - Teheran - Varsavia 
Washington
Banche affiliate e partecipazioni in oltre 30 Paesi del mondo
BANCA COMMERCIALE ITALIANA
Direzione Centrale: Milano - tei. 88501 (45 linee) - telex 310080 BCI HO I
Società per Azioni - Sede in Milano - Registro Società N 2774 - Tnbunale di Milano - Capitale Sociale L 210 000 000 000 - Riseiva legale L 69 000 000 000 - Banca di Intéresse Nazionale
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Eurocard: denaro liquido concentrato.
Il modo di pagare più pratico, più gradito e diffuso nel mondo.
Il più pratico, perchè una carta di Credito Eurocard è una inesauribile 
e preziosissima riserva di denaro contante, senza gli inconvenienti 
e fe scomodità del contante. Il più gradito, perche dietro 
il marchio Eurocard e i suoi associati, Master Card e Access, 
c'è tutta la serietà di una grande banca, a garanzia di 
un'affidabilità che pochissimi possono vantare.
Il più diffuso, perchè sono più di tre milioni i punti 
di vendita convenzionati con Eurocard: 
dagli Stati Uniti alla Russia, dal Brasile alla Cina, 
dalla Svezia al Marocco.
Eurocard: un gesto di stile, conosciuto 




La perfezione e il successo.
La perfezione nell’evoluzione
La superiorità di un progetto 
automobilistico si rivela nel tempo. 
Ovvero nella sua capacità di incor­
porare innovazioni tecnologiche 
mantenendosi fedele alle sue carat­
teristiche fondamentali.
Questa è la ragione del successo 
Alfetta.
Perfezione in un’automobile si­
gnifica prestazioni, sicurezza c con­
fort. E oggi più che mai, guidare una 
Alfetta ha questo significato.
La perfezione nella scelta
Una scelta diventa perfetta quan­
do è qualitativamente e quantitativa­
mente completa. L ’Alfetta è l’unica 
vettura della sua categoria che offre 
tante diverse motorizzazioni e così 
numerose dotazioni: 1.6,1.8, 2.0, 2.0 
TD , 2.4 T D  e Quadrifoglio Oro Elet­




mo. Alfetta Quadrifoglio Oro Elet­
tronica.
Check Control, Trip Computer, 
accensione ed iniezione regolati dal 
circuito Motronic per ottenere il 
massimo risparmio di carburante. 
Ma la sportività e la velocità di una 
vettura di classe non possono prescin­
dere dalla comodità e dall’ctegaiiza.
E allora: comandi elettrici per i 
vetri anteriori e posteriori, regola­
zione elettrica dei sedili, chiusura 
centralizzata delle portiere, tessuti 
ricchi ed esclusivi per sedili e pan­
nelli, verniciatura metallizzata e 
ruote in lega leggera di serie.
U n esempio della perfezione 
nello stile dell’Alfetta: un vero com­
puter da oltre 185 km/h.
La perfezione nel Turbo Diesel
Nelle versioni 2.0 e 2.4 Turbo 
Diesel, l’Alfa Romeo utilizza il VM 
System, il primo propulsore 
diesel automobilistico nato 
direttamente con il turbo- 
compressore. Velocità oltre 
165 km/h, confort, econo­
mia di esercizio, silenziosità.
Queste le
La perfezione nella sicurezza
La tenuta di strada e la frenata 
dell’Alfetta sono, anche nelle peg­
giori condizioni atmosferiche, in 
curva, ed alle più elevate velocità, 
eccezionali, e sempre tali da costi­
tuire una garanzia di sicurezza. 
Questo c dovuto al perfetto equili­
brio della vettura, che ripartisce sag­
giamente i pesi al 50% su ogni asse. 
Infatti, mentre il motore generosis­
simo dell’Alfetta capace di eccezio­
nali riprese in qualsiasi situazione 
anche di emergenza, è montato an­
teriormente, posteriori sono il cam­
bio , la frizione e il ponte De Dion a 
triangolo chiuso con parallelogram­
ma di Watt.
Il massimo dell’equilibrio per il 
massimo della sicurezza.
La perfezione nell’investimento
Ci sono vetture per le quali persi­
no il prezzo c un optional. Il successo 
dell'Alfetta invece, risiede anche nel 
fatto che - nella sua categoria - è quella 
che offre una delle più complete do­
tazioni di serie, compresa nel prezzo.
Il valore di un investimento e la 
sua durata vanno considerati parten­
do da queste premesse.
A questo Alfetta aggiunge una 
affidabilità che la contraddistingue 
e che afferma, anno 
dopo anno, la 
perfezione
di una precisa tipologia di automobili­
sta che esige da una vettura una totale 
identificazione con la sua personalità.
La perfezione  
nell’elettronica: 2.0*T Oro
Anche il meglio ha il suo massi-
risposte che l’Alfetta dà a dii chiede 
un Turbo Diesel diverso.
Senza rinunciare a tutte le 
comodità tipiche dell’Alfetta: ec­
co finalmente un vero campione 
in materia di economia ed affida­
bilità.
del progetto. Alfetta ha, com- 
presa nel prezzo, la 
| Supergaranzia 1+3+6 | : 1 anno 
di garanzia totale +  i  anni di Pronto 
Alfa contro gli imprevisti dell’automo­
bilista +  6 anni contro la corrosione pas­
sante.
Affetta.Un computer sulla strada.
alfa romeo;«. ; i -fi ¡ alfa romeo i j . vìw
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